Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
Volume 35
Issue 2 The Sixteenth Annual Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal Symposium
2019

Beyond the Bankruptcy Code: A New Statutory Bankruptcy
Regime for Tribal Debtors
Laura N. Coordes

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj

Recommended Citation
Laura N. Coordes, Beyond the Bankruptcy Code: A New Statutory Bankruptcy Regime for Tribal Debtors,
35 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 363 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol35/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

COORDESPROOFS_7.2.19

7/2/2019 1:58 PM

BEYOND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: A NEW STATUTORY
BANKRUPTCY REGIME FOR TRIBAL DEBTORS
Laura N. Coordes*
ABSTRACT
Native American tribes and tribal businesses play an important role in U.S.
commerce, but many of these entities are effectively prohibited from filing for
bankruptcy relief when financial distress occurs. This Article demonstrates how
and why the Bankruptcy Code is a poor fit for these “tribal debtors” and
suggests that Congress enact a new statutory regime to provide structured debt
relief for these entities rather than modify the Bankruptcy Code.
Although this proposal is novel with respect to tribal debtors, Congress has
looked beyond the Bankruptcy Code to provide debt relief when use of the Code
would be inapt on two other recent occasions: the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Act and PROMESA. Using tribal debtors as an example, this Article investigates
whether and how this practice might continue and what it might mean for the
bankruptcy system writ large.
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INTRODUCTION
In a crisis, uncertainty is dangerous and terrifying. Financial crises are no
different. The events leading to the 2008 recession caused banks—and
regulators—to panic,1 and U.S. economic policy became unsteady as the Federal
Reserve and lawmakers struggled to respond.2 In particular, the “shocking”
collapse of Lehman Brothers set off a “financial tsunami,” which in turn nearly
“triggered a global financial meltdown.”3
Similarly, after the Supreme Court in 2016 rejected Puerto Rico’s attempt to
enact its own form of bankruptcy legislation,4 Puerto Rico teetered on the brink
of financial collapse. Congress rushed to devise a solution5 in the face of the
commonwealth’s declaration that it intended to default on significant payment
obligations, which threatened to trigger “a cycle of hospital closures, electricgrid instability, infrastructural collapse, and emergency-service breakdowns.”6
When the next crisis strikes, which entities will be left to face the devastating
consequences of uncertainty?
Native American tribes and tribal-affiliated businesses7 (collectively
referred to as “tribal entities” or “tribal debtors”)8 are playing an increasingly
1
Kimberly Amadeo, The 2008 Financial Crisis, THE BALANCE (July 1, 2017), https://www.thebalance.
com/2008-financial-crisis-3305679 (“The mistrust within the banking community was the primary cause of the
2008 financial crisis.”).
2
See John H. Makin, Financial Crises and the Dangers of Economic Policy Uncertainty, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INST. (2012), https://www.aei.org/publication/financial-crises-and-the-dangers-of-economicpolicy-uncertainty/.
3
Adam Shell, Lehman Bros. Collapse Triggered Economic Turmoil, ABC NEWS, https://abcnews.go.
com/Business/lehman-bros-collapse-triggered-economic-turmoil/story?id=8543352.
4
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016).
5
Stephen A. Nuno, Congress Passes PROMESA Act for Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, NBC NEWS (June 29,
2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/congress-passes-promesa-act-puerto-rico-debt-crisis-n601291
(noting that the vote to pass the bill came two days before Puerto Rico faced a $2 billion debt payment).
6
Ed Morales, Who is Responsible for Puerto Rico’s Debt?, THE NATION (June 7, 2016), https://www.
thenation.com/article/who-is-responsible-for-puerto-ricos-debt/.
7
Although this Article primarily discusses tribes and tribal-affiliated businesses together, there are
distinctions between the two. Tribes or Indian nations are “self-governing sovereigns” that “generally exercise
powers of self-government.” Karen J. Atkinson & Kathleen M. Nilles, Tribal Business Structure Handbook,
OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, II-1 (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/tribal_business_structure_handbook.pdf. By contrast, a tribally chartered corporation is “a corporation that
is organized under a tribal statute or code or pursuant to a resolution of an authorized tribal legislative body.”
Id. at III-1, III-3. This Article does not address individual Native Americans, who are eligible to file for debt
relief under chapters 7 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. This Article similarly does not address businesses created
under state law that may have connections to tribes or tribal members, as these businesses are likely able to use
chapter 11 of the Code.
8
Although tribes and tribal businesses are distinct, many of the same problems apply to both in the
bankruptcy context, in part because tribal businesses are often conflated with tribes themselves, as discussed in
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significant role in U.S. commerce,9 yet the U.S Bankruptcy Code makes it
difficult, if not outright impossible, for these entities to use the bankruptcy
system as debtors. Lack of guidance from the Bankruptcy Code in this area
creates uncertainty for tribal entities and those that engage in business with them.
Because tribal entities are increasingly important players in U.S. commerce and
business, uncertainty as to these entities’ treatment in bankruptcy may make
them the next victims of an unexpected financial crisis, with consequences that
could destabilize a significant portion of the American economy.
Although various observers have expressed concern over a tribal debtor’s
lack of eligibility for bankruptcy,10 eligibility is only the first hurdle a tribal
debtor will encounter if it seeks to restructure its debts using the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. Even if a tribal entity were deemed eligible to file for bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Code conflicts with other federal statutes and policies governing
Indian nations and their businesses, such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(“IGRA”). The federal government’s trust relationship with tribes, tribal
sovereignty, the federal regulatory environment, and other tribal laws and
customs pose further challenges for prospective tribal debtors.
These under-explored challenges raise the question of whether tribal entities
should be eligible for bankruptcy or some sort of structured debt relief in the
first place. While acknowledging that exclusion of tribal entities from the
Bankruptcy Code may have been intentional, this Article nevertheless illustrates
that tribal entities can experience debt overhang and holdout creditors in the
Part I.A. Therefore, this Article refers to both entity types collectively as “tribal entities” or “tribal debtors”
except when the distinctions between these entities become important.
9
Atkinson & Nilles, supra note 7, at I-1 (noting that “[t]ribal governments and tribal businesses engage
in a wide range of business and financial transactions,” including “tourism, gaming, energy, agriculture, forestry,
manufacturing, federal contracting, and telecommunications”).
10
See, e.g., R. Spencer Clift, III, The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; Their Recent
Dramatic Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy
Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 181 (2002) (arguing for clarification of a tribe’s status
under the Bankruptcy Code); Amanda L. Cartwright, Can Native American-Owned Casinos File for Chapter
11?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2012, at 50, 50 (noting the lack of a “clear insolvency regime” for tribes); Ji Hun
Kim & Christopher S. Koenig, Rolling the Dice on Debtor Eligibility, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2015, at 18, 19
(noting that “[I]t is not clear whether Congress would be able to easily amend the Code to provide Native
American tribes with a source of relief under federal bankruptcy laws”); Stephan A. Hoover, Comment, Forcing
the Tribe to Bet on the House the Limited Options and Risks to the Tribe when Indian Gaming Operations Seek
Bankruptcy Relief, 49 CAL. W.L. REV. 269 (2013) (arguing that Indian gaming operations should be able to file
for bankruptcy); Alexander Hogan, Note, Protecting Native American Communities by Preserving Sovereign
Immunity and Determining the Place of Tribal Businesses in the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 43 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 569 (2012) (discussing the “uncertainty concerning the place of Indian tribes in the federal
bankruptcy system”); Blake F. Quackenbush, Cross-Border Insolvency & The Eligibility of Indian Tribes to Use
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 61 (2012) (proposing that tribes use chapter 15 of
the Code to file for bankruptcy).
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same way other bankruptcy-eligible entities can. When tribal entities have a need
for bankruptcy’s unique debt restructuring tools,11 this Article advocates for
those entities to be deemed eligible to restructure their debt.
If getting into bankruptcy is the first step, the next step involves determining
how bankruptcy relief can be fashioned for tribal debtors. Rather than use the
Code’s ill-fitting law and procedures, this Article proposes an alternative:
Congress should enact a new statutory regime for tribal debt relief.
Although special debt relief legislation is a novel proposal with respect to
tribal entities, it is not unprecedented. In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Act, which provides for an orderly liquidation process for distressed financial
firms.12 These firms were ineligible to file for relief under the Bankruptcy
Code.13 And in 2016, Congress enacted special debt restructuring legislation for
Puerto Rico, another entity that was deemed ineligible for traditional, Codebased bankruptcy relief.14
With respect to both banks and Puerto Rico, Congress looked beyond the
Bankruptcy Code to create laws specifically tailored to these entities and their
unique attributes.15 Indeed, as this Article will discuss, specialized legislation
may become a new norm in bankruptcy law, as entities previously not
contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code pursue options for debt restructuring.
This Article contends that, like financial firms and U.S. territories, tribal entities
are differently situated from other debtors covered by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Therefore, if Congress were to consider structured debt relief for tribal entities,
these entities deserve a distinct form of relief, one that allows these entities to
concretely address the threat that creditors may destroy ongoing operations.

11
See Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, 94 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1191, 1206–07 (2017) (describing these tools); see also Matthew A. Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher
Education, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697 (2017) (describing bankruptcy tools and applying a framework to evaluate
whether colleges should be bankruptcy-eligible).
12
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).
13
See generally Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985 (2010).
14
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (2016).
15
In addition to these examples, Congress also passed the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, which
created a special court and distinct processes for certain U.S. railroads. Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 986 (1974).
The Act functioned as a “supplement” to the Bankruptcy Act, which predated the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 109 (1974). As a pre-Code law, a full discussion of the Act
and its impact on bankruptcy at the time is beyond this Article’s scope; for a fuller discussion, see Stephen J.
Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About Uniformity, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 53, 56–58 (2017).
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the question of whether
tribal entities should be eligible for structured debt relief. After probing the
nature of the problem of excluding tribal debtors from Code-based bankruptcy
relief, Part I discusses the merits and drawbacks of granting tribal entities access
to relief before concluding that access to structured debt relief is warranted in
distinct cases. Part II then explores possible avenues of relief for tribal debtors.
After surveying existing proposals for granting tribal debtors eligibility for
bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code, Part II introduces on an alternative path:
the creation of specialized bankruptcy legislation.
Part III then explains the process for developing specialized legislation for
tribes and provides guidance on key features of this proposed bankruptcy relief.
Significant features include an automatic stay; a voluntary, orderly process for
debt adjustment and liquidation; exclusivity for tribal debtors to propose a plan;
use of collective action clauses and other sovereign debt restructuring tools,
when appropriate; a property distribution scheme that allows for some equity
retention; strict scrutiny of debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lending; limited
interference into the debtor’s internal affairs; and an adjudicator to run the
process and settle disputes. This Part also analyzes some of the benefits and
drawbacks of the proposed legislation. Part IV concludes by briefly explaining
how specialized law may represent a broader shift for the bankruptcy system as
a whole.
I.

ELIGIBILITY FOR STRUCTURED DEBT RELIEF

Tribal entities are playing an increasingly significant role in U.S. commerce,
yet these entities face uncertainty when it comes to addressing financial
difficulties. It is at best unclear, and at worst outright prohibited, for tribal
entities to use the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as debtors. This Part describes the
current treatment of tribal entities under relevant U.S. laws and highlights some
of the arguments for and against their eligibility for bankruptcy relief.
Ultimately, this Part concludes that tribal entities should be eligible for
structured debt relief in appropriate circumstances.
A. The Status Quo: Confusion and Uncertainty
Tribes and tribal businesses are increasingly involved in commerce—with
the blessing and encouragement of the U.S. government.16 But what happens if

16
See Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism
Succeed?, 80 OREGON L. REV. 757, 760–63 (2001) (contrasting federal control over economic activity and jobs
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a tribal entity experiences financial distress? The answer is unclear for several
reasons. The status of a tribal entity itself is often ambiguous. Is the entity
sovereign? Can it be sued? How much does it resemble a non-tribal business
entity? It does not seem possible for tribes themselves to file for bankruptcy, and
there is no clear answer as to whether a tribal business could use the Bankruptcy
Code. In particular, the Bankruptcy Code conflicts with other laws and policies
pertaining to tribes and tribal businesses. These uncertainties cloud business
relations with Indian nations and may have the effect of closing off access to
lenders and other opportunities.
1. Tribal Entities in Commerce
To date, a handful of tribal-affiliated corporations have sought access to the
U.S. bankruptcy system as debtors.17 Nevertheless, many more tribal entities
experienced financial difficulties during the 2008 financial crisis18 and may have
explored bankruptcy or other debt restructuring options without actually filing.19
In addition, the threat of fiscal distress for tribal entities is significant due to
these entities’ engagement in nearly all areas of commerce.
The 2008 recession was difficult on nearly all businesses, and many tribal
casinos become overleveraged during this time.20 At least six casinos sought to
restructure their debt out of court between 2010 and 2013.21 These restructurings
were largely consensual, as both sides had incentives to negotiate: creditors
wanted the gaming operation to remain in business, produce revenue, and allow
the tribal entity to service its debt, while tribes wanted their gaming assets to
operate because these operations often funded basic public services for tribal

in Indian country with the relatively hands-off policy the federal government takes with respect to non-Indian
businesses).
17
Ji Hun Kim & Christopher S. Koenig, Rolling the Dice on Debtor Eligibility: Native American Tribes
and the Bankruptcy Code, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2015, at 18, 18–19.
18
For example, the La Posta Casino near San Diego shut down due to “lack of business and mounting
debt” in 2012. J. Harry Jones, Santa Ysabel Casino Goes Out of Business, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/sdut-santa-ysabel-casino-debt-2014feb03htmlstory.html; see Jonathan Martin, Elizabeth Warren, Addressing Claims of Native Ancestry, Vows to Press
for Tribes, N.Y. TIMES: POLITICS, (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/us/politics/elizabethwarren-trump.html (noting that some tribes “account for the most impoverished communities in the country”).
19
John Froonjian, Indian Casinos Not Immune to Troubles During Recession, THE PRESS OF ATLANTIC
CITY (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/web_specials/indian-casinos-not-immune-to-troublesduring-recession/article_ea6131b2-9a82-11de-8f64-001cc4c03286.html.
20
Adam Moses, Drowning in Debt? A Look at Recent Debt Restructurings in the Tribal Gaming Industry,
GLOBAL GAMING BUSINESS, (2013), https://www.milbank.com/images/content/1/2/12269/Drowning-in-DebtBy-Adam-Moses-March-2013.pdf.
21
Id. (listing ongoing and recently completed restructurings).
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members.22 Despite these incentives, when disagreements occurred, the lack of
a neutral third party, such as a judge or arbitrator, to resolve these disagreements
sometimes dragged out the process.23 Indeed, tribal restructurings from this
period have been characterized as “rather protracted affairs, with some taking
years to complete.”24
Casinos are popular businesses for tribes, in part because Congress has
supported the development of tribal gaming operations. In 1988, Congress
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”),25 which establishes a
jurisdictional framework governing Indian gaming.26 The Act was designed to
encouraging tribal entities to engage in commerce.27 By 2001, so-called “gaming
tribes” had made a significant impact on the U.S. economy, contributing $32
billion in revenue, $12.4 billion in wages, and creating 490,000 jobs.28 “The
benefits from Indian gaming also spill over to non-Indian communities and to
federal and state tax revenues.”29
Importantly, casinos represent just one component of tribal business.
Significant incentives exist for enterprises that do business with Native
American-owned companies, including access to cash rebates, discounted
leasing rates, and tax-exempt financing.30 For their part, tribal businesses, and
particularly tribally chartered corporations, also enjoy advantages, including
avoidance of state regulation and taxation, as well as ease of formation.31 Tribes
and tribal corporations regularly engage in real estate development,32 banking

22

Moses, supra note 20.
Id.
24
Id. (citing the restructuring of the Foxwoods Resort Casino).
25
Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.).
26
25 U.S.C. § 2702.
27
Id. (“The purpose of this chapter is to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian
tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”).
28
Gabriel S. Galanda, Getting Commercial in Indian Country, 12 ABA BUS. L. SECT. NO. 6 (July/August
2003).
29
ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 71
(Univ. Neb. Press 2013) (2012).
30
See generally Advantages of Doing Business With Native Americans, ABA SECTION OF STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Spring 2016 Meeting, available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/state_local_government/NavigatingTribalWatersRobSaunooke41116.authcheckdam.pdf
(discussing these and other advantages conferred by federal and state law).
31
Choosing a Tribal Business Structure, U.S. DEPT. INTERIOR, Dec. 10, 2015, https://www.bia.gov/sites/
bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/ieed/bia/pdf/idc1-032915.pdf.
32
Terry Pristin, Commercial Real Estate; Arizona Indians Turn to Real Estate Development, N.Y. TIMES:
BUSINESS DAY (Dec. 24, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/24/business/commercial-real-estate-arizonaindians-turn-to-real-estate-development.html (describing “a $600 million commercial development on 209 acres
owned by . . . Salt River Pima-Maricopa families”).
23
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and finance,33 telecommunications,34 wholesale and retail trade,35 and tourism,36
to name a few examples. Indian nations are even getting involved in recreational
marijuana sales: in October of 2017, the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe opened a
10,000-square foot retail store in downtown Las Vegas.37
Notably, tribes are also involved in payday lending and until recently, were
the subject of much attention and focus by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”).38 In January of 2018, the CFPB dropped a lawsuit against a
group of lenders associated with a tribe. The suit alleged that the lenders had
deceived consumers and failed to “disclose the true cost of the loans.”39 In
addition, tribal businesses, particularly in the Southwestern United States, are
heavily involved in the provision of energy and water to surrounding regions, in
addition to employing hundreds of individuals.40 Financial distress for a tribal

33
Jennifer H. Weddle, Nothing Nefarious: The Federal Legal and Historical Predicate for Tribal
Sovereign Lending, 61 FED. LAW. 58, 59 (2014) (“Over the past decade, approximately two dozen tribes have
established online consumer lending enterprises.”).
34
See National Tribal Telecom Ass’n, http://www.nationaltribaltelecom.org/ (describing the
Association’s purpose as “to provide a forum for tribally owned companies and those who work in the
telecommunications industry”).
35
Galanda, supra note 28.
36
Id.
37
Jay Jones, Native American Tribe Opens Huge Pot Store Near Fremont Street in Las Vegas, LOS
ANGELES TIMES: TRAVEL (Oct. 31, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/travel/deals/la-tr-las-vegas-paiutetribe-pot-store-20171030-story.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (noting that the store, an “economic driver,”
employs roughly 35% of the tribe). Several tribes have recently opened marijuana-related businesses. See J.
Harry Jones, Gaming Gone Bust, Tribe Turns to Marijuana Farming, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (May 2, 2017,
6:50 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/communities/north-county/sd-no-ysabel-marijuana-201705
02-story.html (discussing how the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel has turned to marijuana cultivation). Struggling
marijuana-related businesses have also had difficulty using the Bankruptcy Code. See Steven J. Boyajian, Just
Say No to Drugs? Creditors Not Getting a Fair Shake When Marijuana-Related Cases are Dismissed, 36 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 9 (2017) (discussing cases where marijuana-related businesses debtors cannot get relief).
38
Zeke Faux, CFPB Signals Shift by Dropping Payday Lender Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-18/trump-led-cfpb-signals-shift-by-dropping-paydaylender-lawsuit (explaining that online payday lenders associated with tribes are “surprisingly big” businesses
that arose because tribes can argue that regulations pertaining to payday loans do not apply to them since these
regulations are promulgated by state law).
39
Id. (suggesting that the decision to drop the suit came due to the new direction the Trump administration
took with respect to the CFPB).
40
James Rainey, Biggest Coal-Burning Power Plant in the West is Most Likely Shutting Down, NBC
NEWS, (Apr. 11, 2018, 11:23 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/biggest-coal-burning-powerplant-west-most-likely-shutting-down-n864981 (describing the Navajo Generating Station in Arizona as “a
centerpiece of the [reservation’s] economy,” which provides “hundreds of jobs” and “helps light the Southwest
and powers the pumps that send Colorado River water to Tucson and Phoenix”); Noah Silber-Coats & Susanna
Eden, Arizona Water Banking, Recharge, and Recovery, THE ARROYO (2017), https://wrrc.arizona.edu/sites/
wrrc.arizona.edu/files/attachment/Arroyo-2017.pdf (describing “Gila River Water Storage [ . . .], a company that
markets stored water credits primarily to developers”).
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business could therefore have devastating consequences, possibly affecting the
supply of critical resources to entire regions of the country.
Participating in all of these activities brings risks as well as rewards. Tribes
and their affiliate entities might face litigation connected to their activities,41
such as the CFPB lawsuit, or they may incur unsustainable amounts of debt.42
As tribal entities continue to engage in U.S. commerce and to interact with nontribal individuals and organizations, it will become increasingly important for
bankruptcy law to provide guidance on how these entities should be treated when
they are subject to financial distress. Although, as noted, some casinos have been
able to restructure their debts out of court, an out-of-court workout may not be
feasible if a tribal entity is faced with a significant legal judgment,43 persistent
holdout creditors,44 or several creditors clamoring for the same assets.
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, commonly called the “bible” of
federal Indian law,45 has very little on the subject of tribal bankruptcy. As tribal
businesses become increasingly entrenched in the broader commercial sphere, it
is critical that these businesses—and those who interact with them—know what
to expect in the event of a financial setback. Scholars have long recognized the
importance of establishing functioning economies in Indian communities by
developing tribal- and Indian-owned economic activities.46 A necessary, but
understudied, component of this process is ensuring that a system is in place to
restructure or dissolve these economies if and when they fail.

41
Federal Indian Law—Tribal Sovereign Immunity—Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 128
HARV. L. REV. 301 (2014) (“Subsequent economic development by some Indian tribes has resulted in an
increasing number of legal disputes that have run up against tribal immunity.”); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014) (holding that a tribe is immune from suit for commercial activities on nontribal
land as long as federal law has not expressly waived immunity, but noting in dicta that a state may use its own
enforcement measures against individuals affiliated with the commercial activity).
42
Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, COLLIER GUIDE TO CHAPTER 11 ¶ 25.01 (LexisNexis 2012)
(noting that “many casino operators incurred unsustainable debt levels” in the 1990s and 2000s and discussing
tribal ownership of casinos). Professor David Skeel lists “whether unsustainable debt is a potential problem” as
a factor to consider for determining when bankruptcy relief should be available. David A. Skeel, Jr., When
Should Bankruptcy Be An Option (For People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217 (2014).
43
See, e.g., the ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa bankruptcy, discussed infra (Part I.A.3), which was filed due to a large
arbitration award.
44
See, e.g., Omnibus Statement of Facts and Omnibus Declaration of David Chelette in Support Thereof,
In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 at 4 (July 3, 2012) (describing debtor’s failed
attempt to pursue an out-of-court restructuring and creditors’ persistence in pursuing debtor’s assets).
45
“Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law,” LEXISNEXIS STORE, https://store.lexisnexis.com/
products/cohens-handbook-of-federal-indian-law-skuusSku57318.
46
ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 3
(Univ. Neb. Press 2013) (2012).
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2. Tribes’ Uncertain Status
The U.S. legal system is not always clear with respect to its treatment of
tribal entities. If a tribe or tribal corporation is conducting business solely with
other tribal entities or individuals, “Indian law,” a “body of tribal, state and
federal law,” governs.47 Indian nations have the authority to govern themselves
under the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”),48 and many tribes organized under
the IRA have chosen to adopt commercial laws modeled after U.S. laws like the
Uniform Commercial Code.49 Tribes also have the authority to regulate and
adjudicate insolvency matters arising within the tribe.50
Complications arise, however, when entities outside of the tribe enter the
picture. Although Indian nations are commonly referred to as “sovereign,” tribal
sovereignty is not absolute.51 Native American tribes are said to have sovereign
immunity from all federal laws of general application—unless Congress makes
an “unequivocal expression” to abrogate such immunity.52 In the bankruptcy
context, sovereign immunity can prevent creditors from exercising certain
remedies against tribes and can prevent Indian nations from being made subject
to federal and state court jurisdiction.53 Although tribes have the power to
47

Galanda, supra note 28.
25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 5101 (2018)).
49
Galanda, supra note 28.
50
Blake F. Quackenbush, Cross-Border Insolvency & The Eligibility of Indian Tribes to Use Chapter 15
of the Bankruptcy Code, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 61 (2012).
51
See David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from Itself? Tribal
Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 173, 186 (2004) (“If being sovereign
means to be superior in position to all others, or at least independent of and unlimited by any other, tribes are
not in fact sovereign, nor have they recaptured any substantial sovereignty from the national government.”); see
also Stephen J. Lubben, Sovereign Bankruptcy Hydraulics, N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AMER. L. (forthcoming),
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2923407 (“[S]overeignty and sovereign immunity occur along a
continuum.”); Corina Rocha Pandeli, Note, When the Chips are Down: Do Indian Tribes with Insolvent Gaming
Operations have the Ability to File for Bankruptcy Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code?, 2 U.N.L.V. GAMING
L.J. 255, 259 (2011) (describing tribes as enjoying a “relatively sovereign relationship with the federal
government”).
52
Cartwright, supra note 10; Florida Paraplegic, Ass’n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida,
166 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that, although Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act can apply
to public accommodations run by tribes, Congress did not unequivocally abrogate the tribe’s sovereign immunity
to a cause of action under the Act). For a discussion of the tension between tribal sovereignty and Congress’s
plenary power over tribes, see Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Pleanry Power of Congress over the
Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams’ Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 422 (1988). For an
argument that this tension is problematic, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric
Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence’s Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian
Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 443 (1988) (“The effects . . . of a diminished, unequal status for any racial
minority in United States law cannot begin to be attacked and erased until the contradictions in the legal status
of that minority group are recognized and rejected.”) (emphasis in original).
53
Moses, supra note 20.
48
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regulate their own “internal and social relations,” because another authority
(Congress) can abrogate their immunity, they do not possess “the full attributes
of sovereignty.”54 Thus, although tribes are free to “make their own laws and be
ruled by them,” tribal sovereignty is more attenuated when Indian nations
engage in commerce with non-tribal entities, and Congress may use its plenary
power to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in certain circumstances.55
As a general matter, many courts extend comity56 or full faith and credit57 to
tribal court orders. Tribal sovereign immunity from suit also generally extends
to tribal casinos, businesses, and some tribal-affiliated corporations.58 In general,
tribes are only subject to suit in contract if the tribe and contract counterparty
expressly negotiate a sovereign immunity waiver.59 In practice, these waivers
are quite common, and some tribes have even agreed to waive immunity on a
blanket basis for all tribal businesses incorporated under the IRA.60 But despite
the use of sovereign immunity waivers in practice, Indian nations have
successfully challenged these waivers in court and sometimes had them
invalidated.61 Thus, a sovereign immunity waiver is not a guarantee that a
creditor or contract counterparty will be able to subject a tribe to suit outside of
tribal court. Furthermore, application of sovereign immunity to tribal businesses
and commercial activities (rather than to the tribe itself) has been called into
question in recent years.62
When tribal entities engage in commerce, the implications of their sovereign
status can be disputed, whether due to an explicit immunity waiver or the entity’s

54
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (holding that Congress possesses the power to
extend federal criminal jurisdiction to Indians on reservations).
55
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
56
See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997) (determining that principles of comity
govern whether a court should recognize and enforce a tribal court judgment).
57
See, e.g., Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975) (holding that tribal laws are entitled
to full faith and credit in New Mexico courts).
58
See Galanda, supra note 28; see also Bales v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., 606 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (D.N.M.
2009) (holding that tribal corporation was entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to non-Native American
employee’s claims of race and age discrimination).
59
Galanda, supra note 28.
60
Galanda, supra note 28; Haddock & Miller, supra note 51, at 194 (“[M]ost, if not all, Indian tribes have
prospectively waived, and will prospectively waive, their immunity in specific contracts to facilitate business
deals.”).
61
Moses, supra note 20.
62
Padraic I. McCoy, Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Commercial Activity: A Legal Summary and Policy
Check, 57 FED. LAW. 41, 42 (2010); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that expanding tribal immunity to a tribe’s off-reservation commercial activities is
“unsupported by any rationale for [sovereign immunity] doctrine, inconsistent with the limits on tribal
sovereignty, and an affront to state sovereignty”).
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more attenuated sovereign status due to abrogation or the nature of the
commercial engagement. The resulting uncertainty with respect to tribal status
impacts tribes’ treatment under the Bankruptcy Code.63
3. Eligibility for Bankruptcy
Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code governs debtor eligibility. There is no
“uniform treatment or definitive classification of a tribe” in § 109 or, indeed,
anywhere in the Code.64 According to § 109, only a “person” or a “municipality”
may be a debtor under the Code.65 “Person” is defined broadly in the Code and
includes individuals, partnerships, and corporations; however, a “governmental
unit” is not a person.66 Instead, a “governmental unit” is defined in the Code as
“United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; foreign state;
department, agency or instrumentality of [each of the foregoing]; or other
foreign or domestic government.”67 Although tribes are not explicitly listed in
either definition, courts have determined that Native American tribes fall within
the category of a “governmental unit.”68 For Code purposes, this suggests both
that Congress may have abrogated tribal immunity with respect to the Code69
and that Indian nations cannot access the Code for bankruptcy protection.70

63
See Lubben, supra note 51 (“[P]ushing against sovereignty increases the need for a governmental entity
to have access to sovereign bankruptcy.”).
64
R. Spencer Clift III, The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; Their Recent Dramatic
Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy Code and
Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 211 (2002) (claiming a lack of clarity in the Code with respect to
tribes and arguing that “Congress must clearly and plainly authorize the use of tribal property or enact legislation
that insures, guarantees, and safeguards tribes from financial stress”).
65
11 U.S.C. § 109(a).
66
11 U.S.C. § 101(41).
67
11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
68
See, e.g., Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he category
‘Indian Tribes’ is simply a specific member of the group of domestic governments.”); In re Platinum Oil Props.
LLC, 465 B.R. 621, 643 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) (“The language ‘or other foreign or domestic government found
in [§ 101(27)] includes Indian tribes.”); Russell v. Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation (In re Russell), 293 B.R. 34,
44 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003) (“[O]ther foreign or domestic governments in § 101(27) unequivocally, and without
implication, includes Indian tribes as ‘governmental units.’”).
69
In 1994, Congress amended § 106 to demonstrate its intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of
governmental units. Although the impact on tribal immunity is disputed, there is at least an implication that the
sovereign immunity of tribes classified as “governmental units” is abrogated. See, Clift, supra note 10; 1-7
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, §7.05 (LexisNexis 2017) (noting division in the courts as to whether
the Code waives tribal immunity); American Indian Law Deskbook §7:2 (May 2017) (noting that, while the
Ninth Circuit has held that Congress has expressly abrogated sovereign immunity in this context, other courts
disagree); Cartwright, supra note 10 (noting that “an overwhelming majority of courts have held that tribes are
governmental units” under the Bankruptcy Code).
70
Cartwright, supra note 10.
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To understand why tribes do not qualify as debtors eligible under the
Bankruptcy Code, it is useful to know each of the possible chapters available for
prospective debtors.71 Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15 of the Code each outline
a different process for prospective debtors to take. Chapter 7 of the Code governs
the process of liquidation,72 while chapters 1173 and 1374 address reorganization
and individual debt adjustment, respectively. Chapter 9 of the Code provides for
the adjustment of municipal debt,75 while chapter 12 deals with family farmers
and family fishermen.76 Finally, chapter 15 of the Code provides a way for
foreign representatives in bankruptcy proceedings outside of the United States
to access U.S. courts.77
As “governmental units,” tribes do not qualify to file for bankruptcy under
either chapters 7 or 11 of the Code, because both of these chapters require a
debtor to be a “person.”78 Furthermore, only individuals (i.e. individual human
beings) may use chapter 13 to reorganize their debts.79 Although chapter 9 of the
Code addresses the adjustment of debts of municipal governments, a tribe does
not qualify under this chapter either because chapter 9 debtors must be
“municipalities,” which must be governed by a U.S. State.80 Indian nations are
not subject to or instrumentalities of U.S. States and so would not qualify as a
“municipality” under the Code either.81 Tribes also are unlikely to meet the very

71
For an in-depth discussion as to why tribes themselves are ineligible for bankruptcy relief under the
Code, see Pandeli, supra note 51, at 269–73.
72
“Chapter 7 – Liquidation,” 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
73
“Chapter 11 – Reorganization,” 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
74
“Chapter 13 – Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income,” 11 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.
75
“Chapter 9 – Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality,” 11 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
76
“Chapter 12 – Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman with Regular Annual Income,”
11 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.
77
“Chapter 15 – Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases,” 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.
78
11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d). Section 109(d) contains other categories of debtors eligible to file for chapter
11, but none of them would encompass tribes. 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (referencing a “railroad,” “an uninsured State
member bank, or a corporation organized under Section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act . . . .” as eligible for
chapter 11).
79
11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (“Only an individual with regular income . . . may be a debtor under chapter 13 of
this title.”).
80
11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (“The term ‘municipality’ means political subdivision or public agency or
instrumentality of a State.”).
81
Even if chapter 9 were modified so that a tribal debtor could be considered a qualifying “municipality,”
chapter 9 may be inapt for other reasons. For example, chapter 9 is not designed to deal with complex debt
structures, which tribal debtors, thanks to their intertwined relationships with tribes, may have. Vincent S.J.
Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. at 40 (forthcoming 2019)
(noting that chapter 9 was designed to address the debt of special purpose municipalities with “simple capital
structures”). The overall purpose of a tribal debt restructuring is more akin to that of a chapter 11 case than a
chapter 9 case; in particular, liquidation is not an option for chapter 9 debtors. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist.,
242 B.R. 18, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (“[T]he legislative purpose underlying [chapter 9] . . . is to allow an
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specific definitions of “family farmer” or “family fisherman” to qualify for debt
adjustment under chapter 12.82 Finally, although some have proposed to allow
tribes access to bankruptcy court via chapter 15, Indian nations are markedly
different from the foreign representatives contemplated by chapter 1583 and, for
reasons explained below, likely would not be able to successfully use chapter 15
of the Bankruptcy Code either.
Tribal corporations and other business entities owned by tribes are arguably
distinct from the tribe itself.84 Thus, if a tribal corporation met the Code’s
definition of a “person,” it could be eligible to file under chapters 7 or 11.85
However, the sparse case law, discussed below, suggests that tribal corporations
and other tribal business entities may be barred from bankruptcy relief under the
Code if they are too closely affiliated with the tribe itself.86

insolvent municipality to restructure its debts in order to continue to provide public services.”) (emphasis added);
Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, Bondholders, and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 17 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 1, 5 (2014) (noting that chapter 11 serves the “purposes of promoting reorganization and of maximizing
returns to creditors”). Chapter 9 also presupposes a relationship between the municipality and the state in which
the municipality is located, a feature that is not present in the tribal business context. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(c)(2) (requiring state authorization to enter bankruptcy); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2018(c) (“Representatives of
the state in which the debtor is located may intervene in a chapter 9 case.”). Finally, the amount of control a
municipality loses in a chapter 9 may by itself make a modified chapter 9 an unpalatable option, for reasons
discussed infra.
82
11 U.S.C. § 101(18), (19), (19A), (19B), (20) (defining the terms “family farmer,” “family farmer with
regular annual income,” “family fisherman,” “family fisherman with regular annual income,” and “farmer,”
respectively).
83
11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (“The term ‘foreign representative means a person or body, including a person or
body appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or the
liquidation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or to act as a representative of such foreign proceeding.”).
84
Kim & Koenig, supra note 17.
85
See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (defining “corporation” as an “association having a power of privilege that a
private corporation, but not an individual or a partnership possesses” and as an “unincorporated company or
association”).
86
These entities include corporations organized under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act, which
provides that the Secretary of the Interior may issue a charter of incorporation to tribes. Indian Reorganization
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 5101 (2018)). The Department of the Interior
has determined that Section 17 only allows such charters to be issued to tribes (as opposed to tribal members).
For a critical discussion of this issue, see Post of Gabriel Galanda, Amend IRA Section 17 to Allow Federal
Incorporation For Tribal Members, GALANDA BROADMAN, (Jan. 8, 2012), http://galandabroadman.com/blog/
2012/01/amend-ira-section-17-to-allow-federal-incorporation-for-tribal-members (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
In the context of whether tribal corporations can have sovereign immunity, several courts have articulated
various tests to determine whether the tribally-created entity is an “arm of the tribe” and thus enjoys sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Matter of Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, 86 N.Y.2d 553 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1995) (multi-factor test); People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enterprises, 386 P.3d 357 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2016) (five-factor test). For further discussion of the development of tribal corporations formed under the Indian
Reorganization Act and their sometimes complex relationship with tribal governments, see Miller, supra note
46, at 44–46.
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To date, two tribal-affiliated entities (aside from the Alaska Native
Corporations discussed below)87 have sought to be debtors in U.S. bankruptcy
proceedings. In the first case, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, a casino
owned and operated by the Iipay Nation filed for bankruptcy88 after “struggling
financially for years” with “debts of more than $50 million.”89 In its initial filings
with the bankruptcy court, the debtor casino argued that it was a separate legal
entity from the Iipay tribe and thus eligible to file for chapter 11 as an
“unincorporated company.”90 Three parties in interest, including another Native
American tribe (incidentally, also the debtor’s largest creditor) and the United
States Trustee, filed motions to dismiss the case, arguing that the debtor was
ineligible because the casino was merely an arm of the tribe itself.91 The parties
moving for dismissal contended that there was no legal distinction between the
tribe and the entity that ran the casino.92 As evidence, the objecting parties
pointed to the loan documents, which provided that the tribe was the obligor that
owned and operated the casino and which did not distinguish between the tribe
and the casino entity.93 The bankruptcy court granted the parties’ motions to
dismiss by summary order and did not write an opinion.94 Without access to
bankruptcy relief, the casino was unable to negotiate with its creditors, including
the County of San Diego, which the tribal chairman characterized as “unwilling
87
As discussed in Part I.C, infra, Alaska Native Corporations have also filed under the Bankruptcy Code.
As Part I.C explains, these corporations are distinct from other tribal corporations. For this reason, they are
discussed separately.
88
In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2012).
89
J. Harry Jones, Santa Ysabel Casino Goes Out of Business, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Feb. 3,
2014),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/sdut-santa-ysabel-casino-debt-2014feb03-htmlstory.
html.
90
Omnibus Statement of Facts and Omnibus Declaration of David Chelette in Support Thereof, In re
Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2012), available at
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/omnibus-statement-of-facts-and-events.pdf (“The Debtor is an
unincorporated company.”).
91
County of San Diego’s Motion to Dismiss Debtor’s Bankruptcy Case; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support Thereof, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (S.D. Cal. Aug.
7, 2012), available at https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/san-diego-county-motion-to-dismiss.pdf;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Bankruptcy Case for Lack of Eligibility
and Authority, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012),
available at https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/yavapai-apache-motion-to-dismiss.pdf; Acting
United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss Case, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415PB11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012), available at https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/us-motion-todismiss.pdf.
92
See, e.g., Acting United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss Case, supra note 91, at 1 (“The Debtor’s
structure, purpose, and authorization to conduct business activities by a tribal ordinance make it clear that it is
an inclusive part of the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel and is not a separate legal entity.”).
93
See, e.g., id. at 8.
94
Minute Order, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4,
2012), available at https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/dct-minute-order.pdf.
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to renegotiate its financial agreement with the tribe in the face of economic
hardship.”95 Faced with mounting debt, holdout creditors, and no access to
bankruptcy court, the casino shut its doors in early 2014, and 115 employees lost
their jobs.96
In the second proceeding, a tribally chartered corporation wholly owned by
a tribe filed for bankruptcy relief in Arizona. The debtor, ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa Inc.,
owned and operated the Skywalk at the Grand Canyon and filed for bankruptcy
after a $28 million arbitration award was entered against it after a dispute over a
development agreement.97 In its initial filings with the court, the debtor claimed
to be “a tribal corporation that is separate from the [Hualapai] Nation and from
other corporations or instrumentalities of the Nation.”98 Perhaps seeking to
distinguish its situation from that of the Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, the
tribal corporation presented evidence that it had its own board of directors and
that the corporation, rather than the tribe, was the party to the development
agreement in dispute.99 The debtor also argued that the arbitration award was
enforceable only against the corporation and was not collectible from the
tribe.100
No one challenged the debtor’s eligibility for bankruptcy in the ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa
case.101 Ultimately, however, “the debtor and developer settled their dispute and
consensually dismissed the case.”102 Thus, the ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa case does not
provide much clarity with respect to how a tribal corporation might proceed in
bankruptcy.
The dearth of legal precedent, combined with ambiguities in applying the
Bankruptcy Code to tribal entities, make it impossible to be certain whether a
tribal entity will be eligible for bankruptcy relief. The cases to date shed little
light on the issue due to the lack of published legal opinions. Although the

95

Jones, supra note 89, at 1.
Id.
97
See Christine L. Swanick et al., Tribal Court Bankruptcy Petition Raises Issues of First Impression for
Bankruptcy Court, SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP (Mar. 7, 2013), available at https://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c5097886-3631-438b-b774-d4a992fc65b4.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Kim & Koenig, supra note 10, at 19 (“While several contemporaneous articles questioned whether the
debtor was an eligible filer, no parties-in-interest challenged the debtor’s eligibility . . . .”).
102
Id.; see ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa, Inc. Bankruptcy New Filing Alert: Motion for Order Dismissing the Bankruptcy
Case and/or Converting the Case to Chapter 7, CHAPTER 11 CASES (May 21, 2014), available at
http://chapter11cases.com/2014/05/21/sa-nyu-wa-inc-bankruptcy-new-filing-alert-motion-for-orderdismissing-the-bankruptcy-case-andor-converting-the-case-to-chapter-7/.
96
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question of a tribal corporation’s eligibility for bankruptcy may be factdependent, the state of the law is unclear as to whether and under what
circumstances tribal entities will be eligible to be debtors in bankruptcy. Tribal
corporations may thus find themselves in a catch-22: they may experience the
same debt problems as an ordinary business established under state law, but they
may be deemed too closely affiliated with an Indian nation to qualify for
bankruptcy protection.
Even if a tribe—or, more likely, a tribal business—were deemed eligible to
file for bankruptcy, however, tribal entities are likely to encounter distinct
difficulties when proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code. As explained in more
detail below, fundamental inconsistencies in law and policy relating to tribal
entities make relief improbable, if not outright impossible, for tribal debtors to
attain, even if eligibility-related problems could be overcome.
B. Obstacles to Tribal Bankruptcy
Given tribal entities’ significant role in U.S. commerce and the uncertainties
present in U.S. bankruptcy law with respect to tribal debtors, it makes sense to
provide a clear path allowing tribal entities to access structured debt relief.
Nevertheless, tribal entities and others may find such access objectionable on
several grounds. In particular, applying laws created without tribal input, such
as the Bankruptcy Code, may be seen as the imposition of Western norms and
legal traditions onto tribes. Some Indian law scholars have criticized this
imposition in other contexts, arguing that it is tantamount to colonization and “a
diminution of tribes’ inherent right to govern themselves.”103 They point out that
the United States’ own theory of Indian sovereignty supports the perpetuation of
Indian nations’ autonomous existence, even if tribal decisions conflict with
Western ideals.104 Thus, if the Bankruptcy Code were adapted such that it clearly
applied to tribal debtors, its application may still be considered an undesirable
infringement on tribal autonomy.
In some respects, all debtors trade the loss of some autonomy in exchange
for bankruptcy’s benefits. By consenting to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court (and, in some cases, to a trustee’s handling of their assets), debtors in
bankruptcy necessarily give up some of their abilities to manage their own
affairs and make their own decisions in exchange for the benefit of a discharge
of debt. Yet, sovereign debtors arguably pay a higher price for a fresh start than
103
Trevor Reed, Who Owns Our Ancestors’ Voices? Tribal Claims to Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 40
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 275, 300 (2016).
104
Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 800 (2007).
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non-sovereign debtors by giving up their full sovereign rights to enter
bankruptcy. Perhaps recognizing this significant sacrifice, Congress has not
made bankruptcy a remedy for U.S. states.105 Even if Congress has abrogated
tribal sovereign immunity for bankruptcy purposes, a bankruptcy judge’s (or
trustee’s, or creditor’s) ability to divest tribes of property or dictate how that
property is to be used represents a significant loss of independence that tribes
and tribal scholars may not consider to be a fair trade-off, particularly given the
current Bankruptcy Code’s limited usefulness to tribal entities, explained further
below.
A related concern about allowing tribal entities access to structured debt
relief comes from possible incompatibilities between tribal and Western notions
of property.106 Bankruptcy law is based, in part, on the notion that nonbankruptcy law governing property rights should generally be respected in the
bankruptcy system.107 But if a tribal debtor were to file for bankruptcy, and if its
creditors were non-tribal entities, would tribal law or state property law apply in
the bankruptcy case?108 And if tribal law concerning property applied, how
would a bankruptcy court, which likely lacks expertise in tribal property law,
interpret it? In other contexts, scholars have noted that federal courts may feel
uncomfortable enforcing property interests arising under tribal law, particularly
when the type of property at issue lies outside of those courts’ general
expertise.109 Uncertainties surrounding application of property law principles
105
Jennifer Burnett, 3 Questions on State Bankruptcy, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/enews/issue65_3.aspx (quoting Prof. Kenneth Katkin: “The federal
bankruptcy code does not allow—and has never allowed—state governments to declare bankruptcy”). Some
scholars, however, believe bankruptcy should be made available to the states. See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., States
of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012) (arguing for state bankruptcy).
106
See Reed, supra note 103, at 285 (noting that the Supreme Court has expressed beliefs that indigenous
property rules are “based on incomprehensible customs”); Miller, supra note 16, at 764–75 (describing Indian
conceptions of private property and noting conflicting views on private ownership of land, as well as a
demonstrated understanding of private property principles on the part of native peoples); but see ROBERT J.
MILLER, RESERVATION CAPITALISM: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 11–12 (Univ. Neb. Press
2012) (summarizing Indian private property rights and noting that “the only major difference between
Indigenous principles of property and Euro-American concepts was in how those societies viewed the private
ownership of land”).
107
See generally Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (holding that a property issue arising in
bankruptcy should be resolved by reference to state law).
108
Existing cases may provide some guidance on this issue. See American Indian Law Deskbook § 5:19
(May 2017) (collecting cases and noting that “a state’s interests will justify regulation of a tribe or its members
only ‘in exceptional circumstances’”); In re DeCora, 396 B.R. 222, 225 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (finding that tribal
law was determinative of lien-holder priority in a bankruptcy proceeding because the tribe’s “interest in
controlling the distribution of its revenue far outweighs [the State’s] interest in enforcing its commercial code”).
109
See Reed, supra note 103, at 306 (“It is clear that Congress and the courts believe indigenous groups
are entitled to control their lands, culture, and membership by means of sovereign governments operating under
distinct ontological frameworks, but they are also uncomfortable with enforcing indigenous entitlements that
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may make it difficult for contract counterparties and lenders to price the risk of
lending to tribal entities on a secured basis.
Other key differences between the Bankruptcy Code and federal laws
governing Indian nations suggest that Congress was not contemplating
bankruptcy as a possibility for tribal debtors when it created the Bankruptcy
Code. In particular, if a tribal gaming operation, such as a casino, were to file
for bankruptcy, conflicts between the Code and the IGRA would need to be
resolved. For example, the IGRA requires a tribe to hold the sole proprietary
interest in any gaming operation.110 The IGRA would thus be violated if a tribal
gaming operation filed for bankruptcy and a trustee began operating the debtor’s
business pursuant to § 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.111 But even if the debtor
remained in control of the business, as is common in a chapter 11 bankruptcy
case, the Code-prescribed duty of the debtor-in-possession to preserve estate
assets for the benefit of creditors would conflict with the IGRA’s limitations on
creditors’ ability to force a change in management or to assume control of a
tribal gaming facility.112
Perhaps most critically, bankruptcy law’s absolute priority rule conflicts
with the IGRA’s requirement that only the tribe itself can control and possess an
Indian gaming operation.113 The IGRA would thus mandate that equity interests
remain in the organization even if the debtor’s more senior creditors were not
fully repaid.114 This presents a direct conflict with the absolute priority rule,
which stipulates, effectively, that creditors must be paid in full before equity can
receive anything in a bankruptcy.115 The absolute priority rule is at the heart of
the chapter 11 distributional system, and the Supreme Court recently reinforced
the importance of complying with the rule in the context of a plan or structured

arise from these ontological formations that cannot be justified through the logics of American jurisprudence.”).
110
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) [hereinafter IGRA].
111
11 U.S.C. § 1108 (“[T]he trustee may operate the debtor’s business.”).
112
IGRA at § 2710; see Steven T. Waterman, Tribal Troubles – Without Bankruptcy Relief, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Jan. 2010, at 33. Similar problems arise in the non-profit sector. See, e.g., Bruckner, supra note 11, at
727 (“Nonprofit colleges’ lack of shareholders and the nondistribution constraint prevent a bankruptcy filing
from shifting control of that enterprise from its current management.”).
113
IGRA, supra note 110.
114
See Stephan A. Hoover, Comment, Forcing the Tribe to Bet on the House the Limited Options and
Risks to the Tribe when Indian Gaming Operations Seek Bankruptcy Relief, 49 CAL. W.L. REV. 269, 297 (2013);
see also Steven T. Waterman, Tribal Troubles—Without Bankruptcy Relief, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 2010, at
44 (noting that IGRA’s sole proprietary-interest requirement would prohibit a restructuring that converts debt
into equity and that § 1129’s subjugation provisions could not be satisfied without a 100% repayment plan if the
tribe retains the “sole proprietary interest,” as IGRA requires).
115
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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dismissal of a case.116 Thus, the IGRA’s conflict with the absolute priority rule
is significant. Even if deemed eligible to file for chapter 11, if a tribal debtor
cannot propose a plan that conforms with absolute priority—and compliance
with the IGRA likely means it cannot—it will be unable to use the bankruptcy
system to restructure its debts.117
In sum, the IGRA’s limitations on management of a tribal gaming operation
conflict with specific Bankruptcy Code provisions.118 Because confirmation of
a chapter 11 plan of reorganization requires compliance with all regulatory
provisions, including the IGRA,119 it would be nearly impossible for a tribal
gaming operation to successfully restructure its debts under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
There are several other obstacles for tribal debtors seeking to use the U.S.
bankruptcy system. For example, the National Indian Gaming Commission
(“NIGC”) must approve all “management contracts” for tribal gaming
operations, including agreements like trust indentures,120 and some courts have
interpreted this mandate as giving the NIGC broad discretion in construing these
agreements as management contracts.121 Tribes themselves are also different
from other entities that restructure their debts under the Bankruptcy Code. These
differences arise from tribes’ structure, governmental interrelationship, and
dependence on the federal government.122 Certain federal laws, regulations, and

116

Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 136 S. Ct. 1242 (2016).
In certain instances, as in the case of some bankruptcies of nonprofit debtors, courts have held that the
absolute priority rule does not apply. This is typically because these courts have determined that the nonprofit’s
members do not hold equity interests in the nonprofit and that they do not derive an economic benefit based on
their membership interests. See Kavita Gupta, Representing a Nonprofit Debtor in Bankruptcy, 31 CAL. BANKR.
J. 843, 855–57 (2012) (collecting cases); Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable
Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 39 (2012)
(“[C]ourts overall . . . hold that the absolute priority rule is inapplicable to nonprofits.”). In the case of a tribal
corporation bankruptcy, it is unlikely that this exception would apply to excuse compliance with the absolute
priority rule, because unlike members of a nonprofit, tribes do derive economic benefit based on their interests
in the corporation. Indeed, this was the very purpose of IGRA. See Part I.A.1 supra.
118
Hoover, supra note 10, at 296–98 (noting that appointment of a trustee under § 1104 of the Code would
be prohibited under the IGRA).
119
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (noting that the plan must not be “forbidden by law”).
120
Blaine I. Green, Craig A. Barbarosh, & Daron T. Carreiro, Seventh Circuit Rejects Bond Indenture and
Its Waive of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, But Allows Leave to Amend for Equitable Claims, PILLSBURY (Oct. 31,
2011),
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/seventh-circuit-rejects-bond-indenture-and-itswaiver-of-tribal.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
121
Hoover, supra note 10, at 276; Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Lake of the Torches Econ. Dev. Corp., 658
F.3d 684, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that indenture was an unapproved management contract for the
Indian gaming facility and was therefore void as a violation of the IGRA).
122
Waterman, supra note 112, at 87.
117
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treaties apply uniquely to tribal entities;123 consequently, some scholars have
analogized tribal corporations to certain regulated industries, such as public
utilities, rather than run-of-the-mill corporations.124 This unique regulatory
backdrop has led some scholars to conclude that bankruptcy is unworkable for
Indian nations and their businesses.125
A tribe’s relationship with the federal government further complicates
matters.126 The federal government holds about eleven million acres of real
property in trust for tribes,127 meaning that tribes must obtain express approval
from the government in order to sell, convey, or otherwise encumber the trust
property.128 This property is also shielded from alienation under state laws.129
This trust arrangement, with its corresponding restraint on alienation, was
designed to protect and even benefit Indian nations by guaranteeing tribal
possession of land and protecting tribal land from sale by state authorities for
infractions like nonpayment of taxes.130 When an entity is financially distressed,
however, restraints on alienation like the ones that apply to tribes may negatively
impact an entity’s ability to access financing.131 Prospective creditors are
naturally hesitant to lend to entities in financial distress. To entice a creditor to
loan money, a distressed entity may therefore seek to offer creditors a lien on
unencumbered property as security for that loan. Such scenarios are common in

123
See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/
frequently-asked-questions (explaining the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the work that it does with tribal
governments).
124
Waterman, supra note 112, at 87.
125
Id. (suggesting non-bankruptcy alternatives, such as a bailout, for financially struggling tribal
businesses).
126
See Miller, supra note 46, at 38 (“[T]he federal government is heavily involved in most business
dealings in Indian Country.”).
127
Miller, supra note 46, at 37.
128
Purchases or grants of lands from Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (“No purchase, grant, lease, or other
conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution.”); Leases of restricted lands, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2012) (providing that leasing of trust lands must be
approved by the Secretary of the Interior); FRED ANDREW SEATON & ELMER F. BENNETT, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
685 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1958); see Haddock & Miller, supra note 51, at 221 (“That so many of their
assets remain under governmental trust under outdated policy rationales creates great difficulty for indigenous
peoples.”); Miller, supra note 46, at 36 (“‘Trust lands’ are lands that tribal governments or individual Indians
own as the beneficial owner but the United States owns the legal title and is the legal owner.”).
129
Cf. id. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 16.03(4)(d)(iii) (describing how involuntary
transfers of allotments, including those that may occur in bankruptcy, are impermissible and noting that “if an
allotee becomes a bankrupt, title to the allotment does not pass to the bankruptcy trustee”).
130
SEATON & BENNETT, supra note 128, at 685.
131
See Miller, supra note 46, at 44 (“The fact that the United States retains the trusteeship and legal
ownership of these lands makes them almost totally unavailable for borrowing money and for developing
economic activities.”).
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bankruptcy, particularly in the early stages of a case, in order to provide the
debtor with adequate funding to proceed with the bankruptcy case.132 Because
tribes may not encumber trust property without the federal government’s
consent, a tribal debtor’s ability to obtain financing quickly by offering up
unencumbered property may be severely limited if the tribe owns few to no nontrust assets.133
Tribes and tribal corporations thus face severe roadblocks if they seek to use
the Bankruptcy Code. Even if a tribal debtor were deemed eligible to file for
bankruptcy, the Code’s incompatibility with tribal norms, federal laws, and
policies such as the trust relationship make use of the Code unappealing at best
and downright impossible at worst.
C. Incompatibility Illustrated: Alaska Native Corporations
There is perhaps no better illustration of the incompatibility of bankruptcy
and tribal law than the cases of Alaska Native Corporations. Alaska Native
Corporations are regional and village corporations established by the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”).134 Signed into law in 1971, ANCSA
was, at the time, the largest land claims settlement in U.S. history.135 In return
for the abrogation of Native claims to certain aboriginal land, Alaska Natives136
received land and money from the federal government, which were divided
among the various tribal corporations established under the law.137
The Act and its amendments created 13 regional economic development
corporations.138 Alaska Natives hold stock in these corporations, enabling them
to earn income, remain in their traditional villages, and preserve their culture.139
The Act enjoyed significant support from Natives and non-Natives alike and was

132

See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (contemplating mechanisms that a debtor may use to obtain credit).
Moses, supra note 20 (“[T]here are important limitations on what collateral tribes can grant their
lenders without obtaining federal approval, including, for example, limitations on the ability of a tribe to
encumber its land.”).
134
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–24 (1971).
135
Monica E. Thomas, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Conflict and Controversy, POLAR
RECORD,
1986,
http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ancsa/articles/mthomas/ancsa_conflict.htm#Historical
perspective.
136
“Native” is defined in the ANCSA as, inter alia, “a citizen of the United States who is a person of onefourth degree or more Alaska Indian . . . Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or combination thereof.” 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b).
137
E. Budd Simpson, Doing Business with Alaska Native Corporations: A New Model for Native American
Business Entities, ABA BUS. L. SECT., July/Aug. 2007 https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2007-07-08/
simpson.shtml.
138
Thomas, supra note 135.
139
Id.
133
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created with substantial involvement from Alaska Natives.140 Because they were
created for specific purposes under a federal statute, Alaska Native Corporations
are considered “unique,” even in the world of federal Indian law, and represent
a type of entity that is different from most other tribal and non-tribal
corporations.141
Since their creation, a few regional and village corporations have filed for
bankruptcy.142 During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, “conflicts
between the legislative purposes inherent in ANCSA and in the Bankruptcy
Code have come to light,” leading scholars to argue that “the two statutes do not
mesh well.”143 Notably, the Alaska Native Corporations, created by a political
process, were fundamentally different from the voluntary corporations that
characterize much of U.S. commerce.144 In addition, the ANCSA, like the IGRA,
directly inverted the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code, dictating that
Native shareholders receive priority over their creditors.145 Scholars studying the
Bankruptcy Code and the ANCSA noted additional conflicts between the two
statutes relating to taxation; obligations with respect to land; income; and
conflicts with the Code’s liquidation and plan confirmation provisions.146 In
short, “[r]esolving the conflicts between the Bankruptcy Code and ANCSA is
not easy, as neither statute was drafted with a view to harmonizing with the
other.”147 Although the Native Corporations that filed for bankruptcy were able
to use the bankruptcy system, they found the Bankruptcy Code an inappropriate
framework,148 leading scholars to conclude that the only way to reconcile the
Code with the ANCSA was to “relax” interpretations of both statutes.149

140
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, ALASKA HUMANITIES FORUM, http://www.akhistorycourse.org/
modern-alaska/alaska-native-claims-settlement-act (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
141
Simpson, supra note 137 (emphasizing these entities’ uniqueness and highlighting some of the
distinctive opportunities they represent); DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND
AMERICAN LAWS 198 (3rd ed., Univ. of Alaska Press 2012) (1978) (describing the ANCSA as an “evolving”
experiment).
142
Kathryn A. Black, David H. Bundy, Cynthia Pickering Christianson, & Cabot Christianson, When
Worlds Colide: Alaska Native Corporations and the Bankruptcy Code, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 73 (1989),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1251&context=alr.
143
Id. at 75.
144
Id. at 86; see also id. at 91 (“Many of the Bankruptcy Code’s most fundamental underlying assumptions
about corporations . . . do not apply to Native corporations at all.”).
145
Id. at 90.
146
Id. at 101.
147
Id. at 130.
148
See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 141, at xii (suggesting that the 1991 amendments to ANCSA and the
sale of Native net operating losses, rather than the bankruptcy process itself, “rescued several Native corporations
from bankruptcy”).
149
Black, supra note 142, at 131.
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***
The Bankruptcy Code appears ill-equipped to handle tribal debtors of all
sorts. Although tribal entities regularly transact in the U.S. commercial sphere,
it is not clear that these entities, when faced with financial difficulty, will be able
to play by the normal rules of the Bankruptcy Code without requiring
adjustments to both bankruptcy and tribal law. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is
fundamentally incompatible in many ways with the laws and policies pertaining
to tribal entities.
D. The Case for Tribal Debt Relief
If a tribal debtor cannot effectively use the Bankruptcy Code, should it be
cut off from the structured debt relief the Code provides? There are several
reasons why structured debt relief may be valuable to tribal debtors. One reason
relates to these entities’ asymmetrical treatment in the bankruptcy system.
Despite the lack of clarity surrounding tribal entities’ eligibility to be debtors in
bankruptcy, tribal entities can be and have been forced to use the system when
they are creditors of a debtor in bankruptcy.150 The law is clear that parties
adverse to tribes may bring the tribe (or a tribal business) into existing
bankruptcy proceedings as either a party in interest or a creditor.151 This means
that “[c]ourts can force tribes to participate in a system from which they cannot
simultaneously derive a benefit.”152
Of course, Indian nations are not the only entities that can be brought into
court as creditors without being able to use the system as debtors. Banks and
other financial institutions are treated in the same manner,153 and the federal
government, the largest creditor in the country,154 cannot file for bankruptcy.
But providing tribal entities with access to debt relief could bestow distinct

150
Cartwright, supra note 10, at 104 (“In a clear majority of courts, Native American sovereign immunity
is abrogated, and tribal casinos are subject to numerous federal statutes, including the Bankruptcy Code when
they are creditors.”); Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 2.03 (finding that “several cases have concluded,
often without discussion, that the Code applies to the commercial activities of tribes as creditors”); In re White,
139 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that tribe’s participation as a creditor in bankruptcy waived immunity
from adjudication of its claim in bankruptcy proceedings).
151
See, e.g., Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that because
Congress abrogated Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Code, debtor’s adversary
proceeding against the Navajo Nation could proceed in bankruptcy court).
152
Hogan, supra note 10.
153
See generally Hynes & Walt, supra note 13.
154
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. R. Scott Appling, No.
16-1215 at 21 (“The United States is the largest creditor in the Nation and frequently appears as a creditor in
bankruptcy cases.”).
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commercial benefits. For example, some research has shown that access to debt
relief provides more certainty at the lending stage and may even open up new
lending options.155 In contrast, the economic uncertainty that characterizes a lack
of access to bankruptcy relief looms large in the face of a tribal entity’s
default.156 This uncertainty about whether relief is available and what form it
will take increases transaction costs at the lending stage and may deter non-tribal
entities from entering into loans with tribes and their affiliated businesses.157 In
some cases, lack of access to bankruptcy gives creditors leverage over a business
in distress: without the threat of bankruptcy looming, creditors may be able to
coerce distressed entities into accepting terms that favor them and/or give them
substantial control over operations.158
In the tribal gaming context, the IGRA’s restrictions on equity in a tribal
business may prevent creditors from exercising some traditional remedies, such
as foreclosure on tribal property or a debt-for-equity swap.159 But even gaming
lenders retain some leverage. For example, gaming lenders can freeze the credit
markets for tribal gaming entities if a gaming business refuses to cooperate or
negotiate in good faith.160 The gaming industry in particular is incredibly reliant
on credit, so an industry-wide freeze would be particularly harmful.161 Lenders
can also take steps to increase their leverage by asking the National Indian
Gaming Commission, which approves contracts, for a determination that their
loan agreement is not a “management agreement” under the IGRA, such that any
sovereign immunity waivers the gaming company executes would be
enforceable.162 Additionally, lenders who transact with non-gaming tribal

155
See Stephan A. Hoover, Forcing the Tribe to Bet on the House the Limited Options and Risks to the
Tribe When Indian Gaming Operations Seek Bankruptcy Relief, 49 CAL. W.L. REV. 269 (2013); cf. Barry E.
Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 811 (1994) (arguing that “a world without debt or bankruptcy
. . . is efficient”).
156
Hoover, supra note 155.
157
See Hogan, supra note 10; Thomas Weathers, Encouraging Business with Indian Tribes: A Brief
Discussion of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Dec. 2008, https://apps.
americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2008-11-12/weathers.shtml (noting that many nonnative companies and lawyers
“may hesitate to do business with Indian tribes for fear of the unknown”); Haddock & Miller, supra note 51, at
223 (suggesting that tribes might reassure investors by structuring contracts “with an eye to facilitating federal
court intervention in disputes . . . .”).
158
See David McAfee, Marijuana Industry Can’t Partake in Bankruptcy Protection, BLOOMBERG BNA
29 BBLR 717 (June 20, 2017).
159
Scott J. Greenberg & Jeffrey H. Taub, When Tribal Gaming Goes Sour… Rights & Remedies in an
Unclear Legal Environment, CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, Apr. 11, 2011, https://www.lexology.
com/library/detail.aspx?g=d7d11d74-d3a9-45dd-ba14-5ed3d20d34dd.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
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businesses may have more traditional remedies available to them in the face of
a tribal business unable or unwilling to repay debt.
Tribal entities in fiscal distress currently face a no-win situation: their
uncertain eligibility status, combined with the incompatibility of the Bankruptcy
Code with other laws and policies governing tribes, make using the existing
bankruptcy system difficult if not impossible. Nevertheless, tribal entities
seeking comprehensive debt relief have nowhere else to turn if they have
engaged in commerce with other entities. This is because tribal law cannot be
used to “bind dissenting non-tribal lenders.”163 In addition, bankruptcy offers
distinct benefits—including an automatic stay preventing creditor action and the
ability to restructure debt over the objection of creditors—traditionally
unavailable outside of the Bankruptcy Code.164 Thus, tribal law on its own is not
a substitute for bankruptcy when a tribal entity has engaged in commercial
transactions with non-tribal entities. If tribal insolvency law cannot address the
debt restructuring, and if Indian nations are similarly precluded from using the
Bankruptcy Code, this suggests that Congress should devise a path for relief.165
As tribal entities continue to engage in commerce with others, it will become
increasingly likely that they will encounter the same risks that all businesses
face, including debt overhang, holdout creditors, and the need for breathing
space to adjust debts. Indeed, the rise of claims trading and distressed debt
purchases, where parties with no prior interests in the debtor purchase claims in
the hope of making a large return or to thwart a reorganization, makes it likely
that tribal entities, like other U.S. businesses, will be faced with increasing
numbers of creditors uninterested in a consensual debt restructuring.166
Bankruptcy is distinctly equipped to address these problems by providing access

163
Kim & Koenig, supra note 17. The tribal exhaustion doctrine, which requires litigants to exhaust their
tribal remedies before proceeding in state or federal court, likely does not apply to bankruptcy cases because
federal law designates federal courts as the exclusive fora for bankruptcy claims. See Weathers, supra note 157
(“Exhaustion is not required where . . . federal law expressly provides that a claim can only be heard in federal
court.”)
164
For an in-depth discussion of bankruptcy’s unique attributes, see Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong,
supra note 11, at 1206–07. Of course, as described infra, recently Congress has expanded access to bankruptcy
tools to entities not eligible for Code-based relief.
165
For a similar argument in the contexts of municipal bankruptcy and Puerto Rico, see Mitu Gulati &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Puerto Rico and the Netherworld of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 91 S. CAL. L. REV.
133, 149 (2017) (“[T]he power to enact a debt adjustment scheme is an integral part of a state’s sovereign power,
and . . . Congress cannot take that power away and put nothing in its place.”).
166
See generally Randolph J. Haines & John Worth, Trading in Bankruptcy Claims, 1992 ANN. SURV. OF
BANKR. L. 1 (1992) (explaining various motivations for trading in bankruptcy claims); Anthony J. Casey,
Auction Design for Claims Trading, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 133 (2014) (“Claims are traded regularly
in today’s large corporate bankruptcy cases . . . the volume has increased dramatically in the last decade.”).
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to specific tools, namely nonconsensual debt adjustment and the automatic stay,
that are not available elsewhere.167 At bottom, when tribes and tribal businesses
have a demonstrated need for these relief mechanisms, they should be able to
access these tools.
***
There are valid concerns about granting tribal debtors access to bankruptcy
and about the ways in which the Code conflicts with other federal laws,
regulations, and policies toward tribes. Despite these concerns, access to
structured debt relief can provide distinct benefits for Indian nations, including
increased certainty, more options for tribal entities struggling with debts or
holdout creditors, and the ability to access a valuable set of tools traditionally
defined by access to the Bankruptcy Code.
Tribes that engage in commerce with non-tribal entities are effectively
injecting themselves onto a broader commercial playing field. Indeed, Indian
nations often willingly submit themselves to non-tribal law in commercial
circumstances by, for example, waiving sovereign immunity as a concession to
doing business.168 If tribal laws, norms, and customs can be reconciled with
Western ones in the commercial context, it seems inappropriate to limit the debt
relief tribal entities can obtain by foreclosing tribal debtors’ access to bankruptcy
relief. The next Part will discuss what appropriate bankruptcy relief for tribal
entities might look like. Recent experiences suggest that when the Bankruptcy
Code excludes a particular prospective debtor, it is not necessary to try and
reconcile the Code with conflicting laws that apply to that entity. Instead,
Congress can enact special legislation that provides structured debt relief tailormade for entities not eligible to be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.

167
See Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, 94 WASH.
U.L. REV. 1191 (2017); see also Michelle M. Harner, Rethinking Preemption and Constitutional Parameters in
Bankruptcy, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 198 (2017) (noting that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly described
a discharge of a debtor’s financial obligations as one of the hallmarks of a bankruptcy law that is within the
exclusive purview of Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause”); Lubben, supra note 51, at 10 (“Insolvency
systems are designed for debtors that risk having their value destroyed by individualistic creditor behavior.”).
168
See ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION CAPITALISM: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 98
(Univ. Neb. Press 2013) (noting that “there are literally thousands of examples of tribal governments voluntarily
waiving their immunity in contracts” and citing the Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Indian Reservation in
Oregon, which had waived immunity in thirty-five of its approximately 275 business contracts).
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II. SEARCHING FOR RELIEF: THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND BEYOND
If we accept that tribal debtors should be eligible for structured debt relief,
we must next consider where such relief should come from. Scholars have made
various proposals to reform or adapt the Bankruptcy Code to provide a clearer
path for tribal eligibility. Others have suggested that non-bankruptcy
mechanisms, such as bailouts, may be more appropriate forms of debt relief.
After critically reviewing existing proposals, this Part examines the possibility
of taking an alternate path: looking outside the Bankruptcy Code to design tailormade structured debt relief.
A. Existing Proposals
Observers have long been troubled by tribal entities’ lack of access to
bankruptcy relief. Over the years, they have proposed various mechanisms to
create access for these entities. This subsection surveys existing proposals and
offers some commentary on their potential benefits and drawbacks.
1. Proposals for Determining Eligibility
Several proposals deal with the question of how to deem tribal entities
eligible for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. A recent proposal suggests that
courts find that Native American commercial entities are eligible for bankruptcy
using the Tuscarora-Coeur D’Alene doctrine.169 This doctrine splits tribal
activities into two categories: those that are “governmental” and those that are
“commercial” in nature.170 The doctrine divides tribal pursuits so that tribal
economic activities can be regulated in a manner similar to private-sector
business activities in the contexts of federal employment and benefits laws.171
The Tuscarora-Coeur D’Alene doctrine derives from two cases. In the first,
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that “a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes
Indians and their property interests.”172 In the second, Donavan v. Coeur
D’Alene Tribal Farm, the Ninth Circuit limited the application of Tuscarora,
holding that it does not apply if (1) the law in question deals with intramural
tribal self-governance; (2) application would contradict relevant treaties; or (3)

169
Amanda L. Cartwright, Can Native American-Owned Casinos File for Chapter 11?, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., Oct. 2012, at 50.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 51.
172
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960).
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legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not intend for the law to
abrogate tribal sovereignty.173
The synthesized Tuscarora-Coeur D’Alene doctrine has been applied to find
that Native American commercial activities, including casino operations, are
subject to acts of Congress.174 The doctrine thus limits tribal sovereign immunity
to purely intramural governmental matters.175 Using the proposal in question, a
court could extend the doctrine to the Bankruptcy Code to find that Native
American commercial entities are subject to U.S. bankruptcy law and that they
are eligible for bankruptcy.176
Another suggestion for tribal debtor eligibility comes from the immunity
doctrine.177 An early motivation for granting tribes sovereign immunity was the
fear that tribes might otherwise be subjected to economic hardship.178 Indeed,
many Indian nations are still in a precarious economic state such that they are
not financially strong enough to withstand suit.179 Some have argued that if a
tribal entity is protected by immunity, it has less of a need to file for bankruptcy
due to this protection.180 Courts could therefore use the immunity doctrine to
determine whether a tribe’s sovereignty precludes the entity from filing for
bankruptcy.181 For example, under this proposal, a tribal business may not be
covered by tribal immunity and may thus be able to access the bankruptcy
system if (1) the business is sufficiently distinct from the tribe or (2) the tribe
voluntarily waives the immunity upon incorporation.182 Thus, under this
proposal, there would be two categories of tribal enterprises: (1) those protected
by immunity that cannot file for bankruptcy, and (2) those without immunity
that can file.183 This approach appears similar to the one the court in the Santa
Ysabel Resort and Casino case used to determine that the business in that case
was ineligible for bankruptcy.

173

Donovan v. Coeur D’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
Cartwright, supra note 169, at 103.
175
Id.
176
Id.; see also San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. N.L.R.B., 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding
that National Labor Relations Act applied to an Indian-owned casino because applying the Act to a tribe’s
commercial activities would not impair tribal sovereignty).
177
Hogan, supra note 10, at 571.
178
Id. at 590.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 614.
181
Id. at 613.
182
Id.
183
Id.
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Finally, Emir Aly Crowne, Andrew Black and S. Alex Constantin have
argued that when a tribal corporate entity voluntarily enters into a business
contract with non-tribal investors, that entity must be made subject to both
bankruptcy law and to the terms of the agreements it undertakes because
“[b]eing a commercial participant entails being commercially responsible.”184
These scholars contend that when a tribe voluntarily enters the public
marketplace in a commercial capacity, it is subjecting itself to all of the relevant
rules and regulations of that space, including the rules of bankruptcy.185
The above proposals offer various pathways to tribal eligibility for
bankruptcy but do not explain how a tribal bankruptcy should proceed once the
entity is deemed eligible. As the discussion in Part I shows, conflicts between
the Bankruptcy Code and other federal laws that apply to tribes present the need
for clarification and adjustment before a tribal debtor can proceed with
bankruptcy. Thus, although there is uncertainty surrounding eligibility that
should be clarified, if tribal debtors are to successfully use the bankruptcy
system, the inquiry cannot stop at the eligibility stage.
2. Alternative Mechanisms
A second group of proposals calls for exploration of alternative mechanisms
to assist tribes. For example, Blake Quackenbush has proposed using chapter 15
for tribal bankruptcy, arguing that this chapter of the Bankruptcy Code may
“bridge the jurisdictional gap between tribal courts and U.S. [b]ankruptcy
courts.”186
Chapter 15, which was designed to facilitate cooperation between U.S.
courts and foreign courts in cross-border insolvency cases,187 may not be a good
fit for Indian nations for several reasons. First, Indian tribes are distinct from the
foreign states where companies seeking to use chapter 15 are based, as
Quackenbush himself acknowledges.188 Due to the restraints on tribal
sovereignty discussed in Part I, treating a tribe as the equivalent of a sovereign
nation for purposes of chapter 15 bankruptcy recognition is a technically
difficult proposition. In particular, chapter 15 presupposes that the other
sovereigns involved in a case have well-developed laws and public policies

184
Emir Aly Crowne, Andrew Black, & S. Alex Constantin, Not Out of the (Fox)Woods Yet: Indian
Gaming and the Bankruptcy Code, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 25, 26 (2011).
185
Id. at 44.
186
Quackenbush, supra note 10, at 69.
187
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.
188
See Quackenbush, supra note 10, at 76.
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related to bankruptcy. Thus, to use chapter 15 successfully, tribes would have to
enact “substantial portions” of the Bankruptcy Code—portions which, due to
their conflicts with the IGRA and other federal Indian law, would need to be
further adapted for tribal use.189 In all, applying chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy
Code to accommodate tribal debtors would require significant adaptations, to
both chapter 15’s application and to tribal law itself. Thus, simply arguing that
tribal debtors should use chapter 15 does not resolve the conflicts identified in
Part I.
An alternative proposal suggests that Congress could simply consider a
bailout for fiscally distressed tribal entities.190 A bailout for tribal debtors is not
as simple as it may seem, however. Bailout proposals are politically charged and
are often extremely unpopular, with many contending that an offer of a bailout
encourages reckless behavior.191 In addition, if numerous tribal entities were
suffering from severe financial distress, due perhaps to another acute recession,
Congress may be in the difficult position of having to pick and choose which
Indian nations it would offer to bail out.192 Thus, bailouts may be both politically
unpopular and economically undesirable.
In sum, alternatives to traditionally considered avenues for tribal bankruptcy
are creative but likely difficult to implement, requiring adjustment in both legal
and political contexts.
3. Clarification
The final set of proposals simply calls for clarification to the Bankruptcy
Code when it comes to tribes.193 In particular, Congress could refine provisions
relating to tribes’ status and eligibility under the Code, as well as whether Indian
nations may be subject to involuntary bankruptcy petitions.194 One commentator

189

See Quackenbush, supra note 10, at 81–82.
See Waterman, supra note 110, at 87.
191
See, e.g., Sita Slavov, The Hidden Cost of Bank Bailouts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 26,
2013, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2013/09/26/study-shows-bank-bailouts-are-anincentive-to-be-reckless (citing research that suggests bailing out banks “made the financial system riskier”);
Daniel Mitchell, Why the Bailout is Bad for America, REALCLEARPOLITICS, Oct. 1, 2008, https://www.
realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/10/financial_bailout_would_impose.html (arguing that bailouts “will hurt
the U.S. economy in the short run and long run”).
192
See Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy,
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3120145 (“Bailouts
create opportunities for government favoritism.”).
193
See Clift, supra note 10, at 207.
194
See id.
190
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has suggested that Congress settle the matter of tribal eligibility using either
“appropriate legislation or statutory amendment to the Code.”195
Cohen’s Handbook on Federal Indian Law notes that applying the Code to
tribal government debtors is “problematic” and suggests that these debtors be
dealt with “by the tribes themselves and by the executive or legislative branches
of the federal government.”196 Yet, Cohen’s Handbook also notes that tribally
owned business entities “should be entitled to petition in bankruptcy.”197
Cohen’s Handbook does not, however, elaborate on how issues with tribal
government debtors should be addressed nor on how a tribal business might
navigate the Bankruptcy Code if deemed eligible to file.
In other words, amending the Code or creating new legislation with tribes
specifically in mind would provide clarity where there is currently only
confusion. This Article has already detailed the challenges that amending the
Code would entail, given the significant conflicts with the IGRA and other
federal laws. However, providing clarity through “appropriate legislation” is an
as-yet-underexplored avenue.
***
Although the existing proposals contemplate various ways in which tribal
debtors could access the bankruptcy system, none have resolved the thornier
problem of reconciling the Bankruptcy Code with the body of federal law,
policy, and customs relating to Indian nations. Indeed, scholars have been unable
to articulate how a bankruptcy would proceed should a tribal debtor be deemed
eligible.198 Until recently, the prospect of structured debt relief for tribal debtors
seemed inconceivable. As the next subsection explains, however, recent events
offer significant promise on this front.
B. Specialized Laws for Otherwise Ineligible Entities
This subsection provides the necessary backdrop for this Article’s proposal:
Congress should enact special legislation providing tailored bankruptcy relief to
tribes. Although this proposal may seem radical, it is not unprecedented. Indeed,
Congress has twice recognized that the Bankruptcy Code is not an appropriate
195

Id. at 252.
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 2.03.
197
Id.
198
See Pandeli, supra note 51, at 274–79 (concluding that a chapter 7 liquidation would be “legally
challenging, impractical and against federal policy with respect to Indian tribes” and that a chapter 11
reorganization would come with “caveats,” including an inability to use a debt-for-equity swap).
196
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solution and has instead adopted new and entirely personalized debt relief laws,
once in the context of Puerto Rico, and once in the context of financial
institutions. Each will be discussed in turn.
1. PROMESA
In 2016, Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”),199 marking a new approach to
bankruptcy law in the United States.200 PROMESA is not a pure bankruptcy law;
rather, the legislation recognizes Puerto Rico’s unique status as a U.S. territory
with a complicated debt structure, providing a mixture of Bankruptcy Codebased rules and procedures and sovereign debt restructuring practices to aid
Puerto Rico in its financial struggles.201
PROMESA, which was passed in response to Puerto Rico’s severe economic
crisis, was designed uniquely for Puerto Rico and has no application to other
U.S. debtors, including other U.S. territories.202 Signed into law by President
Obama, PROMESA allows Puerto Rico to enter into a form of bankruptcy and
creates a financial oversight board to govern the territory’s fiscal decisions.203
PROMESA has been described as one of “the most collaborative and bipartisan
pieces of legislation” that Congress has passed in recent years.204
PROMESA’s enactment occurred one day before Puerto Rico defaulted on
substantial payment obligations,205 and the events leading up to PROMESA’s
passage were turbulent. In 2014, Puerto Rico, already deeply in debt and
concerned that its municipalities were not eligible for relief under the

199
See PROMESA: A Summary of the Puerto Rico Oversight Legislation, KUTAK ROCK NEWS &
PUBLICATIONS, Sept. 7, 2016, http://www.kutakrock.com/PROMESA-Puerto-Rico-Oversight-EconomicStability-Act/ [hereinafter PROMESA Summary].
200
See Cheryl D. Block, Federal Policy for Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments: The U.S.
States and Puerto Rico, 53 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 215, 232 (2017) (describing PROMESA as a “hybrid
procedural approach to restructuring Puerto Rico’s otherwise unpayable debt”).
201
See id.; see also James Spiotto, Beyond Hurricane Maria: Federal Action in Puerto Rico with
PROMESA, MUNINET GUIDE, Dec. 7, 2017, https://muninetguide.com/federal-action-in-puerto-rico/ (noting
that PROMESA was designed to be a mixture of past mechanisms used to resolve governmental financial
distress).
202
See Sheelah Kolhatkar, Profiting from Puerto Rico’s Pain, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 6, 2017) (noting
that Puerto Rico has been described as “America’s own Third World country”).
203
See id.
204
See Melissa Jacoby, Aurelius Seeks a Do-Over; Puerto Rico and the Appointments Clause Litigation,
CREDIT SLIPS, Jan. 8, 2018, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/01/aurelius-seeks-a-do-over-puertorico-appointments-clause-litigation.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed
%3A+creditslips%2Ffeed+%28Credit+Slips%29.
205
See PROMESA Summary, supra note 199.
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Bankruptcy Code,206 passed its own Recovery Act to try and address its
problems firsthand.207 The Recovery Act would have enabled some of Puerto
Rico’s instrumentalities to adopt debt restructuring plans.208 The U.S. Supreme
Court quickly declared the Recovery Act invalid on the grounds that the
Bankruptcy Code preempted the Act.209 According to the Court, Puerto Rico
was subject to the Bankruptcy Code, even though its municipalities were
ineligible to file under the Code, because the territory fell within the Code’s
definition of a “State.”210 Therefore, the Recovery Act was preempted by the
Bankruptcy Code’s provision prohibiting states from enacting their own
bankruptcy legislation. Puerto Rico’s path to structured debt relief thus entailed
exhausting all possible legal options before Congress acted.
PROMESA is “the first of its kind in many respects.”211 Key features of the
Act include an automatic stay, which stayed all actions and litigation against
Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities to collect or enforce liabilities or claims
and actions to possess or control their property;212 the oversight board, which
has broad authority and discretion over the territory;213 a path for Puerto Rico
and its instrumentalities to file a case to reorganize debts via a plan of
adjustment;214 and provisions for collective creditor action to modify bond
terms.215 Many Bankruptcy Code provisions are incorporated into PROMESA,
including the Code’s conditions for a court to confirm a bankruptcy plan.216 Yet
overall, PROMESA goes beyond Code-based bankruptcy relief to address
Puerto Rico’s unique needs as a territory.217 As much as PROMESA and the
Bankruptcy Code share certain characteristics, PROMESA makes significant
departures from the Code, notably in the inclusion of the oversight board and
206
The Bankruptcy Code “allows only the municipalities of states to declare bankruptcy.” Jose A.
Cabranes, 3 Main Reasons Why Puerto Rico Can’t Declare Bankruptcy, BUSINESS INSIDER, July 22, 2015,
http://www.businessinsider.com/3-main-reasons-why-puerto-rico-cant-declare-bankruptcy-2015-7 (last visited
Feb. 28, 2018) (emphasis in original).
207
See id.; Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No.
71.
208
See PROMESA Summary, supra note 199.
209
See Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938.
210
See id. The Court also noted, however, that Puerto Rico was not a “State” for purposes of determining
whether a state’s municipalities may be debtors under the Code. Id.
211
PROMESA Summary, supra note 199.
212
See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2194 (2016).
213
See PROMESA Summary, supra note 199.
214
See generally Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §2161 et
seq. (2016).
215
See PROMESA summary, supra note 199; Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2231 et seq. (2016).
216
See PROMESA Summary, supra note 199.
217
See id.
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creditor collective action clauses, as well as in allowing the territory itself to
adjust all of its debts “in a comprehensive process.”218 “PROMESA is thus not
solely for the purpose of adjusting or reorganizing the debts of Puerto Rico or
covered instrumentalities, but has broader purposes.”219
Since its passage, PROMESA, and the oversight board in particular, have
been the subject of much debate and criticism. In 2017, one of Puerto Rico’s
creditors, hedge fund Aurelius Capital Management, sued, seeking a dismissal
of the debt relief proceedings and a declaration that the oversight board was
unconstitutional.220 Notably, Aurelius argued that the board’s creation violated
the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.221 Although the board’s members
answer to the President, their appointments were never confirmed by the
Senate.222 Aurelius also argued that the process for appointing the board’s
members violates separation of powers principles.223 Namely, six out of the
seven board members were, according to Aurelius, “hand-picked” by
Congress.224 Aurelius sought to bar the oversight board from operating until it
has been “validly constituted.”225
Although the court ultimately held that establishment of the oversight board
was constitutional,226 the Aurelius litigation highlights some of the uncertainties
that can be exploited in new legislation such as PROMESA. In addition, because
PROMESA is different from a typical U.S. bankruptcy proceeding, Puerto Rico
and those affected by its financial crisis have had to hire numerous experts to
help interpret the law and chart the way forward.227 The Puerto Rican
218
Colin Dwyer, Puerto Rico Makes Unprecedented Move to Restructure Billions in Debt, NPR, May 3,
2017,
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/03/526750751/puerto-rico-makes-unprecedentedmove-to-restructure-tens-of-billions-in-debt (calling PROMESA “a bankruptcy process custom-built for Puerto
Rico’s debt crisis”).
219
PROMESA Summary, supra note 215.
220
Tom Hals, Aurelius Hedge Fund Seeks to Toss Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Filing, REUTERS (Aug. 7,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-bankruptcy/aurelius-hedge-fund-seeks-to-tosspuerto-ricos-bankruptcy-filing-idUSKBN1AN27H.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Opinion and Order Denying the Aurelius Motinos to Dismiss the Title III Petition and for Relief from
the Automatic Stay, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., No. 17 BK 3283-LTS, Doc. # 3503 (Jul. 13,
2018).
227
Elizabeth Olson, Judge Pushes Back Against $75M in Fees for Puerto Rico Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG
BNA BANKR. L. REP. (Mar. 19, 2018) (quoting the court-appointed fee examiner’s report, which stated that the
Puerto Rico bankruptcy presents “profound” legal issues and that “financial and legal professionals working on
these cases have confronted massive challenges of time and distance, analysis and advocacy, with little directly
applicable precedent”).
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government alone had paid nearly $300 million to advisors as of November
2017, with the amount projected to grow as the territory continues to pursue a
debt restructuring under the new law.228 As the territory already does not have
enough money to go around, funds paid to advisors represent money that will
not go toward paying creditors.
Austerity measures229 and the influence of the oversight board have also
been the subject of substantial criticism. On the island, the board is colloquially
known as “La Junta,” a reference to a ruling group that comes to power by
force.230 Protests have erupted in San Juan, Puerto Rico’s capital, in response to
the board and the measures it has imposed.231 Residents and observers have
expressed concern that “the whole democratic process [is breaking] down” due
to PROMESA.232 Even the United Nation’s Commissioner on Human Rights
has weighed in, noting that “Puerto Rico’s human rights [are]…being massively
undermined by the economic and financial crisis and austerity policies.”233
In passing PROMESA, Congress made a deliberate choice to pursue an
individualized solution to Puerto Rico’s pressing debt problems.234 As scholars
have observed, Congress could have chosen to amend the Bankruptcy Code to
extend its relief to Puerto Rico and its political subdivisions.235 The fact that
chapter 9 of the Code did not apply to Puerto Rico’s municipalities has even
been described as a “technical error.”236

228
Kolhatkar, supra note 202 (“If we don’t come out of this with a new and super-improved Puerto Rico
. . . this has just been a total waste of time.”).
229
See Michelle Kaske, Greek Tragedy Redux? Puerto Rico Embraces Risky Austerity Plan, BLOOMBERG
BNA BANKR. L. REP., Mar. 15, 2018 (describing an austerity-focused plan promulgated by Puerto Rico’s
governor and noting that “self-imposed discipline is bound to increase the pain, much as it did in Greece”).
230
Ed Morales, Puerto Rico’s Political and Economic Crisis Deepens, THE NATION, May 24, 2017,
https://www.thenation.com/article/puerto-ricos-political-economic-crisis-deepens/.
231
Id. (“The fiscal oversight board is seen on the island as an external force, emblematic of Puerto Rico’s
second-class status.”).
232
Id.
233
“Puerto Rico: Human Rights Concerns Mount in Absence of Adequate Emergency Response,” U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, Oct. 30, 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22326&LangID=E.
234
For an argument that Title III of PROMESA violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy
Clause, see Stephen J. Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About Uniformity, 12
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53, 54–55 (2017) (suggesting that extension of PROMESA to include the U.S.
Virgin Islands could “potentially defuse the uniformity issue”).
235
John A. E. Pottow, What Bankruptcy Law Can and Cannot Do for Puerto Rico, 85 REV. JR. U.P.R. 689,
700 (2016).
236
Id. (“I testified a year ago urging Congress to fix [the error], but for mysterious reasons it has not yet
done so despite long-pending legislation.”).
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In creating a debt restructuring path for Puerto Rico outside of the
Bankruptcy Code, Congress demonstrated that for certain entities, in this case
territories with “layers upon layers of debt,”237 ordinary bankruptcy law is inapt.
As a quasi-sovereign U.S. territory, Puerto Rico is situated differently from other
debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.238 PROMESA is thus an example of
Congress’ ability to design tailored bankruptcy relief for special entities.
The experience with PROMESA lends further support to extending
specialized bankruptcy relief to tribal entities. Thanks in part to their quasisovereign status, tribal entities face roadblocks to using the Bankruptcy Code.
Yet, PROMESA also serves as a cautionary tale of the repercussions of waiting
for a crisis to strike before passing legislation. Puerto Rico’s financial crisis and
legal limbo spurred Congress to act; if Congress had deliberated more
thoroughly on PROMESA’s effects on the commonwealth and its citizens, it
could perhaps have avoided some of the problems Puerto Rico is facing as it
struggles to adjust its debt under the guidance of the oversight board.
2. Dodd-Frank
After the 2008 financial crisis, Congress saw the need for serious bank
financial reform.239 Banks are ineligible to file under the Bankruptcy Code;
instead, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) can exercise
substantial control when a bank becomes insolvent.240 In 2010, Congress passed
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “DoddFrank Act” or the “Act”) to provide comprehensive regulatory reform and to
better prepare banks to face fiscal distress.241
The Dodd-Frank Act was designed to mitigate the systemic risk of the
collapse of significant financial institutions.242 The Act created the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, which monitors U.S. financial markets, and requires
certain large financial companies to submit periodic reports and “living wills”
237

Pottow, supra note 235, at 701.
See, e.g., Frank Shafroth, Fiscal Economic Dislocation?, THE GMU MUNICIPAL SUSTAINABILITY
PROJECT, Jan. 22, 2017, https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2018/01/22/fiscal-economic-dislocation/
(describing federal tax reform that “treats Puerto Rico as a foreign jurisdiction”).
239
The Dodd-Frank Act: A Cheat Sheet, MORRISON & FOERSTER, 2010, http://media.mofo.com/files/
uploads/Images/SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf.
240
See generally Hynes & Walt, supra note 13 (explaining that the FDIC acts as a receiver when a bank
becomes insolvent). In contrast, bank holding companies can and do file for bankruptcy. Id. at 987 n.2.
241
The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 239, at 2.
242
Post of David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG., July 7, 2010, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/
summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-regulation-legislation/.
238
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that outline steps to be taken in the event of financial distress.243 Notably, the
Act established a so-called “orderly liquidation mechanism,” which allows the
FDIC to seize, break up, and wind down a failing financial company whose
failure would threaten financial stability across the U.S.244 In its role as a
receiver for these institutions, the FDIC wields significant powers, including the
power to take over and manage the company’s assets, merge the company with
another company, create a “bridge financial company,” and transfer any of the
company’s assets or liabilities without approval.245 Under the same orderly
liquidation provisions, the government can provide a loan to the failing financial
institution, and such loan must be backed by the assets of the firm and recovered
either in the resolution process itself or from the largest members of the financial
industry.246
Like tribal debtors, financial institutions cannot use the Bankruptcy Code as
currently constituted. Indeed, “the failure of a systemically important financial
institution is materially different from that of most non-financial businesses.”247
Yet, Congress provided tools to aid these struggling financial institutions.
Congress did not enact bankruptcy relief for financial institutions;248 however,
it did provide these institutions with a set of tools tailored to address their unique
status and position in the United States. Like a big bank failure, the financial
failure of tribal entities is materially different from that of a non-tribal entity, in
particular given the tribal entity’s need to coordinate with other federal
regulators.

243

Id.
Id.; Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy,
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN (noting that Dodd-Frank “includes an ‘Orderly Liquidation Authority,’ that
gives federal regulators broad powers to place failing ‘financial companies’…that pose systemic risk into a
receivership administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation”).
245
Huntington, supra note 242.
246
Id.
247
Levitin, supra note 244.
248
Congress has recently been contemplating bankruptcy for banks. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R.
10 (proposing to replace Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority with a bankruptcy procedure to address
the failure of systemically important financial institutions). For a discussion as to why bankruptcy is inapt for
banks, see, e.g., Mark Roe, Don’t Bank on Bankruptcy for Banks, PROJECT SYNDICATE, Oct. 18, 2017,
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bank-bankruptcy-regulations-by-mark-roe-2017-10
(“Restructuring a mega-bank requires pre-planning, familiarity with the bank’s strengths and weaknesses,
knowledge of how to time the bankruptcy properly in a volatile economy, and the capacity to coordinate with
foreign regulators.”).
244
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III. DESIGNING TRIBAL DEBT RELIEF
PROMESA and the Dodd-Frank Act illustrate two instances where Congress
looked beyond the Bankruptcy Code to provide relief for entities that were not
included in the Code’s eligibility provisions. Like territories and financial
institutions, tribes are not contemplated as prospective debtors under the
Bankruptcy Code. And just as Puerto Rico and many banks found themselves in
situations where a debt restructuring was desirable, Indian nations and their
businesses may encounter similar scenarios. It is thus not inconceivable that
Congress would enact structured debt relief for tribal entities. And, as
PROMESA and Dodd-Frank show, this debt relief need not come from the
Bankruptcy Code. Instead, Congress can create specialized legislation for
entities for whom use of the Code would be impractical.
This Part sketches out some key features of structured debt relief for tribal
entities and flags potential issues to be resolved. Because this Article’s proposal
calls for substantial input from the groups the legislation would impact, the
Article does not attempt to draft the proposed legislation in detail. Rather, what
follows are guidelines as to what specialized bankruptcy relief for tribal debtors
should look like.
A. Key Features and Benefits
The previous Parts identified several major problems with allowing tribal
debtors to use the Bankruptcy Code. Although tribal entities often engage in
commerce as if they were ordinary commercial players, they simply cannot be
treated like ordinary commercial debtors. Specialized bankruptcy legislation for
tribal entities would give tribal debtors and their creditors the same certainty
afforded to other entities when they take out loans or otherwise engage in
commerce.
1. Substance
Bankruptcy laws for tribal debtors should provide these entities with access
to the same basic tools afforded to other debtors under the Bankruptcy Code—
namely, protection from creditor debt collection attempts via an automatic stay,
and the means to allow tribal debtors to liquidate (in the case of a tribal business
entity) and to adjust their debts without the full consent of all creditors. These
tools are the hallmarks of U.S. bankruptcy law and are part of what distinguish
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bankruptcy from other forms of debt relief.249 Thus, the general purpose of a
tribal bankruptcy law should be consistent with bankruptcy’s overarching goals:
resolving debt overhang, eliminating holdout creditors, and providing breathing
space to financially distressed debtors.
To achieve these goals, however, adjustments will have to be made to
acknowledge the ways in which tribal debtors are uniquely situated. For
example, although tribes are sovereign, tribal sovereignty is unlike the
sovereignty of an independent nation, whose sovereignty cannot be abrogated
by a higher power.250 If bankruptcy law is to apply to tribal entities, it is
important that bankruptcy not overly detract from tribal sovereignty. Specialized
bankruptcy legislation should therefore recognize Indian nations’ unique status
and contain provisions that balance respect for tribal sovereignty with the goals
of bankruptcy law. For example, any tribal bankruptcy should be voluntary,251
meaning that the bankruptcy process should be initiated only by the tribal entity
itself, rather than a creditor or other party in interest. In this way, tribal debtors
will not be forced into bankruptcy. In addition, tribal debtors should be granted
exclusivity,252 meaning that they should be the only entities able to propose a
plan of liquidation or debt adjustment. Incorporating these elements into the
legislation protects tribal sovereignty interests. In addition, these provisions may
make tribes who are not involved in commerce feel more comfortable with the
legislation, since they will not be forced into a bankruptcy filing or forced to
comply with a plan imposed upon them.253
The sovereign nature of Native American tribes suggests that a tribal
bankruptcy law could also draw upon sovereign debt restructuring tools, for
example by providing for the use of collective creditor action to modify the
terms of a debt instrument. Similar to what Congress did in PROMESA, tribal
bankruptcy law could draw from a mixture of sovereign debt restructuring tools
249
See Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong, supra note 167, at 1206–07 (delineating bankruptcy’s unique
functions).
250
See “The Issue of Sovereignty,” GLOBALIZATION 101 (2016), http://www.globalization101.org/theissue-of-sovereignty/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) (“State sovereignty is the concept that states are in complete
and exclusive control of all the people and property within their territory.”).
251
11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (“A voluntary case . . . is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
petition…by an entity that may be a debtor.”).
252
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (noting that “only the debtor may file a [chapter 11] plan until after 120
days after the date” the bankruptcy petition is filed).
253
Such “opt-in” features have become a trend with respect to recent congressional legislation as it pertains
to tribes. See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, H.R. 725, 111th Cong. (2010) (requiring tribes to actively
opt in if they want expanded punitive abilities); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47,
113th Cong. (2013) (designating “participating tribes,” which can elect to use special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction).
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and domestic bankruptcy provisions that recognize that tribal debt might be
hybrid in nature—a mix of ordinary commercial loans and loans and guarantees
backed by the tribe itself. Incorporating sovereign debt restructuring practices
into the proposed legislation may be particularly valuable if a tribe itself were to
seek a debt restructuring, or if a tribal business entity’s debt was linked so
closely to the tribe itself (i.e. through guarantees, cross-default provisions, or
other contractual stipulations) that the tribe was heavily involved in the
bankruptcy process.254
Several other important features of the proposed law deserve consideration.
It will be critical to establish rules for determining what property becomes
property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, available for distribution to creditors.
It will also be necessary to develop a property distribution system that is fair to
creditors yet respects external constraints such as the IGRA’s requirement that
the tribe be in control of any tribal gaming operation. As a starting point for
addressing these issues, Congress might look at bankruptcy reorganizations for
nonprofits, churches, and heavily regulated entities. Courts have sometimes held
that different rules apply in these bankruptcies,255 and scholars have offered
creative proposals to reconcile the application of the Bankruptcy Code to
nonprofit and church debtors.256
A critical part of many bankruptcy cases is debtor-in-possession (“DIP”)
lending, in which a creditor extends money to the debtor to allow the debtor to
proceed in bankruptcy. DIP lenders may be creditors the debtor has previously
dealt with, or they may be entirely new lenders. Regardless of their identity, DIP
254
Scholars have suggested, for example, that tribal governments might provide start-up loans and other
sorts of funding to businesses operated on reservations. Miller, supra note 16, at 857–58.
255
See, e.g., In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that absolute priority
rule was not violated when debtor’s plan contemplated cooperative members remaining in control of reorganized
debtor); In re Whittaker Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 149 B.R. 812 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that absolute priority
rule not violated when individuals retained control of a non-profit hospital after bankruptcy); In re Gen.
Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local 890, 265 F.3d 869 (2001) (noting that the absolute priority
rule is generally applied to for-profit corporations facing bankruptcy) (emphasis added).
256
There is a growing body of scholarly literature on this topic. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11
Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit
Entities, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31 (2012) (arguing that the fair and equitable standard encompasses more than
the absolute priority rule and that, viewed in this light, the rule can be applied to nonprofits); Amelia Rawls,
Comment, Appling the Absolute Priority Rule to Nonprofit Enterprises in Bankruptcy, 118 YALE L.J. 1231
(2009) (proposing a framework for courts to adjudicate absolute priority claims in nonprofit bankruptcies); Reid
K. Weisbord, Charitable Insolvency and Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 10 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 305 (2013) (proposing for the appointment of bankruptcy examiners in nonprofit reorganizations
involving substantial charitable assets because, among other problems, the absolute priority rule does not apply
in this context). For a discussion of tensions that arise in church bankruptcy cases, see David A. Skeel, Jr.
“Sovereignty” Issues and the Church Bankruptcy Cases, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 345 (2005).
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lenders typically exercise a substantial amount of power and influence over the
debtor during the case.257 Indeed, many scholars have expressed concern about
the outsize influence of DIP lenders.258 Similarly, in the sovereign debt
restructuring context, lenders who provide bailouts or other emergency funds to
sovereign nations often attach stringent conditions to their loans and impose
severe austerity measures.259 It will be important for tribal bankruptcy legislation
to provide a DIP lending structure that does not accord undue influence to DIP
lenders or to the U.S. government, which holds property in trust for many Indian
nations. Giving the tribal debtor the exclusive ability to propose a plan may help
curtail lenders’ influence. Another possibility would be to provide standards for
adjudicator scrutiny over DIP loan terms to ensure that the terms are not unduly
onerous for the tribal debtor and do not impinge upon tribes’ right to self-govern.
Alternatively, using its plenary powers, Congress could simply allow trust
properties to be offered to creditors when a tribal debtor is in bankruptcy. This
could give tribal debtors a broader choice of potential DIP lenders as well as
decrease the federal government’s oversight over trust properties.260
In general, Congress should tread carefully when it comes to oversight of the
debtor. Both PROMESA and the Dodd-Frank Act provide for substantial
external oversight of the financially distressed entities in question. The
PROMESA oversight board exercises significant authority over Puerto Rico and
its instrumentalities,261 while the FDIC and other financial regulators exert
substantial control over a struggling financial institution under the Dodd-Frank
Act.262 As discussed, the oversight board in particular has been the subject of
much criticism, as observers and critics note that it wields its power despite its
members not being democratically elected.

257
Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy,
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN (noting that “call[ing] the shots” in a bankruptcy case “is what DIP lenders
do”).
258
See, e.g., Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381, 406–07 (2015)
(critiquing occasions when “the debtor and its powerful supporters—including its lawyers and postpetition
lenders—run every aspect of the case”); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed Doors: The
Influence of Creditors in Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1155, 1158 (2011) (noting that
creditors’ self-interest is the most common reason for creditor disputes).
259
See, e.g., Laura N. Coordes, When Borders Dissolve, 93 CHI-KENT L. REV. 649 (2018) (describing the
effects of austerity measures imposed in Greece).
260
Such an arrangement would have broader implications for the federal government’s relations with
Indian nations, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article.
261
Morales, supra note 230.
262
Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy,
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN (noting that Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority “gives federal
regulators substantial discretion in whether to trigger the authority and gives the FDIC substantial discretion in
implementing a receivership”).
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As a measure of respect for tribal sovereignty, tribal bankruptcy legislation
should break with this pattern of extreme external oversight and instead consider
a more limited approach to interference with tribal affairs. The protests in Puerto
Rico and the backlash from the United Nations, described previously, should
serve as cautionary tales about the perils of enacting changes without the consent
of the governed.263 To ensure minimal interference with tribal affairs, Congress
could draw upon chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits undue
influence with municipal affairs, for inspiration.264 Recognition that tribal
entities carry potentially weighty sovereignty concerns is important to avoid the
knee-jerk imposition of significant external oversight.
Another key consideration will be the individual or panel running the
proceedings. Entities restructuring their debts under the Bankruptcy Code do so
primarily under the auspices of bankruptcy judges.265 In contrast, under
PROMESA, a district court judge oversees the restructuring proceedings.266
Although Congress’s precise reasons for choosing a district judge over a
bankruptcy judge are unclear,267 the drafters may have believed there were
distinct benefits to district court oversight that would inure to Puerto Rico,
perhaps because unlike bankruptcy judges, district courts are Article III
judges.268 Additionally, in sovereign debt restructurings, there is a growing
practice of using arbitration to resolve claims.269 Thus, it need not be a given
263
See Coordes, When Borders Dissolve, supra note 259 (discussing the drawbacks of enacting significant
changes in the absence of political will). For a view that PROMESA actually gives the oversight board too little
power in certain respects, see David A. Skeel, Reflections on Two Years of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., 87 REVISTA
JURIDICA UPR 862 (2018).
264
In practice, however, judges in chapter 9 cases regularly exercise substantial authority. See Laura N.
Coordes, Formalizing Chapter 9’s Experts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1249; Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and
Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 58-59 (2016) (describing judicial work-arounds of
chapter 9’s limitations); Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1206 (2016) (discussing ways judges can overcome chapter 9’s
limitations and arguing that it is appropriate for judges to do so).
265
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (“Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under [the
Bankruptcy Code].”).
266
48 U.S.C. § 2168 (“[T]he Chief Justice of the United States shall designate a district court judge to sit
by designation to conduct the case.”).
267
See “Puerto Rico: PROMESA and Presiding Judges,” ABI, https://www.abi.org/feed-item/puerto-ricopromesa-and-presiding-judges (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) (speculating that the Natural Resources Committee,
which drafted PROMESA, “may not have been in the best position to appreciate the . . . risks” resulting from
appointment of a district judge to oversee Puerto Rico’s restructuring proceedings).
268
See Melissa B. Jacoby, Presiding over Municipal Bankruptcies: Then, Now, and Puerto Rico, 91 AMER.
BANKR. L.J. 375, 390 (2017) (questioning the accuracy of any perception of greater expertise on the part of these
district judges and noting the “significant institutional costs of forfeiting the formidable body of substantive and
procedural expertise a bankruptcy judge would have brought to the task”).
269
Abubakar Isa Umar & Muhammad Bello, The Utility of International Investment Arbitration in
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 14 U.S.-CHINA L. REV. 335, 336 (2017) (“[D]espite initial skepticism,
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that a bankruptcy judge oversee the case. Instead, the merits and drawbacks of
various options, including bankruptcy and district court judges and arbitrators,
should be discussed to determine the best fit. Among other factors, expertise, the
desired role for a judge or arbitrator, and the ability of the parties to play a role
in choosing the judges or arbitrators may be relevant to the ultimate decision.270
For example, bankruptcy judges have specialized expertise in restructuring debt,
something that may be valuable in the context of a potentially complex tribal
case. On the other hand, giving the parties the ability to choose an arbitrator (or
panel of arbitrators) to oversee the case may provide both specialized expertise
and reassurance to tribal debtors that they will have a role in selecting their
adjudicator. There may also be efficiencies in the arbitration process that are
harder to match in a more traditional courtroom setting.271
2. Process and Benefits
The process for creating this specialized tribal bankruptcy law is as
important as the substance of the law itself. Although this Article has set forth
recommended features, the exact contours of the legislation should be defined
in consultation with the parties that the legislation is designed to impact—
namely, tribes, tribal businesses, and non-tribal entities that play a significant
role in tribal commerce.272 The Bureau of Indian Affairs, a federal agency tasked
with partnering with Indian nations to “help them achieve their goals for selfdetermination,”273 would also likely play a role in shaping the new legislation.274
A collaborative process for drafting the proposed legislation minimizes the risk

international arbitration is gradually becoming an option for addressing claims arising from sovereign debt
defaults.”); see Christoph G. Paulus, A Standing Arbitral Tribunal as a Procedural Solution for Sovereign Debt
Restructurings, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/468980-1238442914363/5969985-1295539401520/9780821384831_ch13.pdf
(discussing a proposal for the creation of a sovereign debt arbitral tribunal).
270
See also Laura N. Coordes, Formalizing Chapter 9’s Experts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1249 (cautioning that,
despite facial limitations on judicial power in chapter 9 cases, judges exert substantial influence and control over
a case through the use of appointed experts).
271
See Melika Hadziomerovic, Note, An Arbitral Solution: A Private Law Alternative to Bankruptcy for
Puerto Rico, Territories, and Sovereign Nations, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1263, 1285-86 (2017) (noting the
“considerable” “time and cost efficiencies of arbitration”).
272
For a discussion of the history and practice of consultation and consent in relations between American
Indian nations and the United States, see Robert J. Miller, Consultation or Consent: The United States’ Duty to
Confer With American Indian Governments, 91 N.D.L. REV. 37 (2015).
273
Mission Statement, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/bia (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
274
Involving the Bureau of Indian Affairs, while politically likely, may raise its own concerns. See
Haddock & Miller, supra note 51, at 175 (“Indians would benefit from a reduction in oversight from Washington
that would place them on a footing with other citizens.”).
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of the new law being perceived as forced upon tribal entities without their input
or consent.275
Although it may be possible to amend the Bankruptcy Code to allow tribal
entities to use it, an advantage of special legislation is that it could be drafted
specifically to take account of tribes’ unique status and the extensive legal,
regulatory, and policy frameworks surrounding tribal entities. By building
legislation from the ground up, Congress could accommodate the unique needs
of these quasi-sovereign, heavily regulated entities—needs not currently
contemplated anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code.
Creation of a new law requires significant time and effort—and complying
with that new law may also require time and money.276 Yet, Congress need not
start completely from scratch. Legislators can and should draw upon existing
bankruptcy law, tribal law, and sovereign debt restructuring practices to create
structured debt relief for tribes, much in the way Congress drew from multiple
restructuring techniques when it drafted PROMESA.277 In addition, by putting
effort in to enact a law before a crisis hits and immediate action becomes
necessary, Congress can ensure that affected parties have time to react to the
effects of the legislation before dire need for relief is demonstrated.
Encouraging action before a crisis is one of the primary challenges in
bankruptcy law.278 As the experiences with PROMESA and Dodd-Frank
illuminate, relief sometimes appears either just before or even after a crisis has
reached a breaking point.279 Given the extent of tribal entities’ engagement in
commerce, it seems likely if not certain that the next recession or financial
downturn will affect tribal entities, causing them to look for debt relief. Acting
now, before a wave of tribal bankruptcies creates uncertainty and instability for
Indian nations and the entities that do business with them, can help ensure that
when tribal debtors seek bankruptcy relief, adequate, timely relief will be

275
This risk is coming to fruition in Puerto Rico, where citizens have protested against PROMESA’s
oversight board. See Edwin Melendez, Is Congress’ Plan to Save Puerto Rico Working?, THE CONVERSATION,
July 31, 2017, https://theconversation.com/is-congress-plan-to-save-puerto-rico-working-80785.
276
See, e.g., Kolhatkar, supra note 202 (discussing the numerous experts Puerto Rico’s oversight board
hired to assist it with interpreting and carrying out the provisions of PROMESA).
277
See David Skeel, Reflections on Two Years of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., 87 REVISTA JURIDICA UPR 862 (2018).
278
See, e.g., Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong, supra note 11, at 1214 (discussing literature describing
government “officials . . . delay[ing] bankruptcy relief or avoid[ing] it entirely”).
279
Such hasty relief sometimes results in a suboptimal framework. See David A. Skeel, “Single Point of
Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative” in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS 313, 314 (Martin N. Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014) (contrasting the Title II process Congress devised
in Dodd-Frank with the single point of entry strategy regulators actually use to implement a Title II resolution).
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available to them. In addition, Congress can avoid possible negative effects of
hastily-enacted legislation.280
Developing unique legislation tailored to tribal debtors may work well for
several additional reasons. First, as previously discussed, reconciling the
Bankruptcy Code with other laws governing tribes would be a complex and
difficult task. Puerto Rico’s experience provides a telling illustration of just how
difficult an undertaking this might be. Although many believed that Puerto
Rico’s municipalities might be eligible for debt relief under chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the territory itself had substantial debt that would not have
been addressed even if its instrumentalities were deemed eligible for chapter
9.281 Similarly, “tribal debt” may take the form of debt owed by a tribe or by a
tribal corporation. As complex and difficult as enacting new legislation would
be, a specialized bankruptcy law would likely be a better fit given potential
multiple layers of debt for tribal entities. Further, as discussed, merely amending
the Bankruptcy Code to make tribal debtors eligible for bankruptcy would not
resolve the numerous conflicts with the IGRA, tribal law and customs, and other
federal laws and policies applicable to tribes.
PROMESA is an example of how legislation can be tailored to address a
prospective debtor’s unique needs.282 Yet, observers have expressed concern
that Congress, in imposing extensive external oversight as a condition of debt
relief, has gone a step too far. Seeking input from critical potential players in a
tribal bankruptcy may help address this concern in the context of a tribal
bankruptcy law. Notably, involving Indian nations in the deliberative process
may help tribal entities accept the new law and be more willing to use it in times
of distress.283

280
See John Copeland Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1 N.Y.U. J.L & PUB. POL’Y
163, 173 (1997) (noting that “a lack of deliberation, a lack of careful drafting, and the inability to ascertain the
people’s intent characterize statutes that are hastily enacted by the legislature”).
281
Jose A. Cabranes, 3 Main Reasons Why Puerto Rico Can’t Declare Bankruptcy, BUSINESS INSIDER,
July 22, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/3-main-reasons-why-puerto-rico-cant-declare-bankruptcy2015-7 (noting that an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code would have addressed less than half of Puerto Rico’s
total debt, leaving the island with “crippling payments” on the other two-thirds of its debt and smothering
economic growth).
282
Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, NBC NEWS, June 30,
2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-how-promesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741.
283
See Joel Brockner, Why It’s So Hard to Be Fair, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2006 (proposing that
companies pay more attention to stakeholders’ needs when undergoing change); Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate
Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 1715 (2018) (arguing that there is “a strong public interest in
understanding who makes the key decisions [in bankruptcy] and whether that process comports with basic
constitutional and democratic norms”).
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B. Concerns
Specialized bankruptcy legislation for tribal entities comes with its share of
trade-offs. As discussed, starting from “scratch” may be a more expensive and
uncertain process than amending existing law. Yet, if tribal entities are to have
access to structured debt relief, the process of providing that relief will be a
difficult one no matter the route that is taken. Amending the Bankruptcy Code
to accommodate tribal debtors would require sorting out and resolving the
various conflicts between the Code and other laws and policies that apply to
tribes. Simply ignoring the problem and allowing the Bankruptcy Code to
continue to apply as-is to tribal debtors is unworkable and would prevent
bankruptcy’s rules from applying neutrally and predictably.284 By contrast,
creating new legislation allows Congress to avoid conflicts at the outset and
signals that tribal entities are distinct, in many ways, from other debtors.
Although creating and implementing a new system is costly, leaving tribal
debtors to navigate an ill-fitting bankruptcy system imposes its own significant
costs. In the long run, having a system that works for tribal debtors and that
addresses the concerns and needs of those affected will ideally provide more
efficient results than the status quo.
Another concern may arise from Congress’s constitutional directive to create
“uniform” laws on the subject of bankruptcies.285 Although there is room for
debate on what exactly this requires, scholars and jurists have interpreted this
provision of the Constitution to prohibit “private” bankruptcy laws that affect
only particular debtors.286 Furthermore, in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,
the Supreme Court stated that laws passed on the subject of bankruptcy must be
uniform throughout the United States, but that uniformity is geographical rather
than personal.287 This means that the general operation of bankruptcy law must
be uniform even though it may result in particular differences in different states.
Thus, while diversity in local law inevitably produces non-uniform results in

284
See Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy,
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN (arguing that financial institution bankruptcy is “not workable as a restructuring
system” and would “undermine the credibility of the bankruptcy system writ large” if attempted, despite
acknowledging that bankruptcy offers the appearance of “neutral,” “predictable,” and “generally applicable”
rules).
285
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
286
Todd Zywicki, Bankruptcy Clause, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION, https://www.
heritage.org/constitution/articles/1/essays/41/bankruptcy-clause; see Lubben, supra note 234, at 53 (“What it
means for a bankruptcy law to be uniform is massively unclear.”).
287
Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
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bankruptcy cases in different states, this outcome does not contravene the
uniformity requirement.288
Legal arguments notwithstanding, uniformity is also valuable from a policy
perspective. Generally applicable laws, whereby debtors and creditors receive
the same treatment, create predictability and certainty and contribute to a
perception of overall fairness in the bankruptcy system. Special legislation, as
suggested above for tribal debtors, pushes against the policy benefits of
uniformity.
In the context of tribal entities, however, uniformity with other types of
debtors seems inapt. As discussed above, tribes are sovereign entities that seem
to fall outside of the scope of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, Article I, Section
8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall have the power to
regulate Commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes.”289 This indicates that Indian nations were (and should be)
considered separate from the federal government, the states, and foreign
nations—they are, essentially, in a class by themselves.290 Indeed, as Part I
illustrates, tribal entities are often given special treatment outside of the
bankruptcy context to encourage business development. This warrants separate
legislation—legislation that would apply uniformly to Indian nations as a class
of debtor.
If Congress does not act pursuant to its Bankruptcy Clause authority, it could
perhaps draw upon other sources of authority to enact the proposed
legislation.291 The Plenary Power Doctrine gives Congress ultimate authority
with regard to matters affecting Indian tribes.292 There is also a trust relationship
288
Brian A. Blum, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR 84 (5th ed.)
(Aspen 2010).
289
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
290
See also Lubben, supra note 234, at 58 (summarizing the Supreme Court’s holding in a uniformity case
as providing “Congress with the ability to enact laws dealing with geographically isolated problems, as long as
the law operates uniformly upon a given class of creditors and debtors”) (emphasis added).
291
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 5.01 (“Congress’s power to give effect to [the Constitution’s
Indian commerce clause and treaty clause], coupled with the supremacy of federal law provides ample support
for the federal regulation of Indian affairs.”).
292
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central function of the
Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”);
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to
legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”);
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians
has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not
subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”); Darrel Smith, Why Indians are Second
Class Citizens: Congress’ Plenary Power, Tribal Sovereignty and Constitutional Rights, CITIZENS EQUAL
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between the federal government and the tribes,293 which implies that the federal
government has a duty to protect tribes. This in turn implies the necessary
legislative and executive authorities to effectuate that duty.294 As noted above,
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution explicitly provides that Congress’s
power to regulate commerce extends to “[c]ommerce . . . with the Indian tribes”
rather than commerce within the tribes.295 Accordingly, any bankruptcy-related
law that Congress enacts should deal only with situations in which debt problems
extend beyond the tribe itself. If a tribe’s financial distress is contained within
the tribe (i.e., all involved are members of the tribe or otherwise affiliated with
the tribe), Indian nations can and should address that distress using tribal law.
Thus, it is likely that Congress has the authority to enact specialized
bankruptcy legislation for tribal entities, given their unique status under U.S.
law. Separate, specialized legislation for tribes would not impact the uniformity
requirement because the same law would be applied equally to all tribal
entities.296
It is also important to recognize that tribes and tribal businesses are distinct,
not just from non-tribal entities, but from each other. The collaborative process
this Article proposes for creating the legislation should seek input from a wide
range of tribal entities and creditors, as well as experts, legislators, and other
policymakers. But involving so many entities in the creation of legislation risks
fostering disagreement that could slow down or halt the process. To facilitate
progress and ensure that the legislation is completed in a timely manner, the
process for getting input could be based on other, similar processes that have
resulted in effective legislation in the past, such as the process used to create the
ANCSA (described below)297 or the commissions the American Bankruptcy
RIGHTS ALLIANCE, http://citizensalliance.org/indians-second-class-citizens-congress-plenary-power-tribalsovereignty-constitutional-rights/.
293
Stephen L. Pevar, The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship: Its Origin, Nature, and Scope,
www.saige.org/conf/12CO/TrustResponsibilityOutline%20SAIGE2012.doc.
294
Id.
295
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 5.01 (noting that the Indian commerce clause recognizes tribes
“as distinct political entities” and that the clause is “broader in scope” than the portion of the commerce clause
dealing with interstate commerce); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (“The power of
establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce . . . that the
expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.”); but see Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455
U.S. 457, 469 (1982) (cautioning that Congress may not enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws under the Commerce
Clause).
296
Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 227 (1957)
(“[I]t is no accident, we think, that the Bankruptcy Clause speaks of ‘uniform laws,’ rather than one ‘uniform
law,’ which Congress may pass on the subject of bankruptcies, thus leaving Congress a free hand in adopting, if
it so desired, different laws for different types of debtors.”).
297
See Part I.C, supra.
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Institute uses to promulgate suggestions for improvements to the Bankruptcy
Code.298 Some amount of compromise will be inevitable in this process, but a
collaborative product will help to ensure that tribal entities are not coerced into
becoming debtors in a system they do not want or need.
Allowing the parties affected by the legislation to have a say in the drafting
process, while democratic, may have other significant downsides. Lobbyists for
various sides may battle for influence, and the resulting legislation risks
mirroring the preferences of the wealthiest and/or loudest voices. Despite these
potential drawbacks, history has demonstrated that it is possible for a
collaborative, inclusive drafting process to achieve satisfactory results. The
Bankruptcy Code itself is the result of an extensive, collaborative effort
involving multiple parties with diverse viewpoints.299
Another prominent example of such a process was the one leading to passage
of the ANCSA. The Alaska Federation of Natives, a coalition of “more than 400
Alaska Natives representing 17 Native organizations,” was formed to address
issues with the land rights of Alaska Natives and was extremely involved in
passage of the ANCSA, as well as in providing assistance with implementation
of and subsequent amendments to the Act.300 Although the resulting legislation
was not perfect, it received substantial support on both sides of the political
aisle.301 The process leading to the ANCSA’s passage thus illustrates that there
are ways to overcome deadlock and ways to work with those most affected under
the proposed legislation to achieve a result that is workable and satisfactory.
Whether through the development of a coalition interested in bankruptcy issues
for tribal debtors, or through some other means, it is possible for the pitfalls of
the drafting process to be minimized.
There may be also concerns that treating tribal debtors differently may
disadvantage Indian nations and their citizens by subjecting them to different
standards than non-tribal entities. These concerns have arisen in other contexts
298
Purpose of the Commission, ABI COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11,
http://commission.abi.org/purpose-commission (last visited Feb. 26, 2018); The ABI Commission on Consumer
Bankruptcy, ABI COMMISSION ON CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY, https://consumercommission.abi.org/ (last visited
Feb. 26, 2018).
299
See RONALD J. MANN, BANKRUPTCY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 24–25 (Cambridge University
Press 2017) (“[T]he Code was not produced by the partisan designs of a single party or drafted to satisfy the
interests of particular businesses.”).
300
History, ALASKA FEDERATION OF NATIVES, http://www.nativefederation.org/about-afn/history/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2018).
301
See Eric F. Myers, Letter to Rep. Don Young, AUDUBON ALASKA (May 15, 2013),
http://docs.audubon.org/sites/default/files/documents/representative_young_-_sealaska_hr_740_5-15-13_final.
pdf.
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where special legislation has been passed that uniquely applies to tribes. For
example, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)302 sets distinct federal
requirements that apply only to state child custody proceedings involving Indian
children.303 Critics of the ICWA have asserted that it violates the equal
protection rights of parents of Indian children by treating them differently from
other parents.304 Indeed, the ICWA is a “dramatic departure” from most state
laws involving child custody proceedings and requires significant procedural
and substantive differences from a non-Indian child custody proceeding.305 Like
this Article’s proposed legislation, the ICWA was passed in part because of
concerns about non-Indian actors failing to appreciate the differences between
Indian and non-Indian practices.306 Although the ICWA has “brought attention
to the unique needs of Indian children,”307 its critics contend that the Act also
took away significant personal liberties.308
Experience with the ICWA thus demonstrates both the benefits of special
legislation in the sense that it can address unique needs and situations, as well as
the drawbacks, in the sense that the effects of different treatment may bring
disadvantages. For this reason, care should be taken to ensure, as much as
possible, that bankruptcy legislation for tribes does not result in inherently
unequal treatment or put Indian nations, their citizens, or their creditors at a
disadvantage solely because of the fact that the debtor is a tribal entity. Involving
tribal entities, creditors, and other representatives in the drafting process, as
described above, and ensuring that drafters are given the time necessary to solicit
feedback and input on the legislation will be critical to ensuring that the
proposed legislation does not have overly adverse results.
Ultimately, this proposal does treat tribal entities differently than other
debtors. However, as described in Part I, tribal entities are given different
treatment in nearly every other commercial respect, and there is a long history
in U.S. law of distinct treatment of Indian affairs.309 This different treatment has

302

25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.
About ICWA, NICWA, https://www.nicwa.org/about-icwa/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
304
Christine D. Bakeis, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Violating Personal Rights for the Sake of
the Tribe, 10 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 543, 543-45 (1996).
305
B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: The Need for a Separate Law, AMERICANBAR,
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index/indi
anchildwelfareact.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
306
Id.
307
Id.
308
Bakeis, supra note 304, at 544.
309
See generally Miller, supra note 16 (exploring the federal government’s different treatment of
reservation economies compared with the capitalism principles it applies to the rest of the American economy).
303
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been upheld in the courts as based on tribes’ unique political status.310 More
specifically, the fact that a tribal debtor experiences financial distress—even the
same type of distress as a non-tribal debtor—does not mean that tribal debtors
should be expected to conform to the same bankruptcy laws as non-tribal entities
when those bankruptcy laws are an ill fit.
CONCLUSION: A BROADER PERSPECTIVE
In recent years, Congress has taken the unusual step of creating bankruptcylike laws tailored to address the unique, complex difficulties of special types of
prospective debtors. This Article suggests that Congress could do the same for
Native American tribal entities, which are distinctly situated and have
effectively been barred from traditional bankruptcy relief. This Article thus
reinforces the notion that, in certain circumstances, access to key debt
restructuring tools does not have to come through the Bankruptcy Code itself.
If Congress provides tribal entities with their own debt restructuring
legislation, it could represent a broadening of U.S. bankruptcy law, as well as a
fragmenting of the Bankruptcy Code. As debt structures become increasingly
complex311 and as U.S. states face their own staggering debt problems,312 it may
be desirable for Congress to pass new legislation uniquely tailored to address
issues and entities independently of the Bankruptcy Code. Technological
developments have also created new potential debtors,313 along with assets, such
310
See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding statutory hiring preference in the Bureau
of Indian Affairs because the intent was to aid Indian self-government); Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Jud.
Dist. Of Mont., in and for Rosebud Cty., 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (“[E]ven if a jurisdictional holding
occasionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has access, such disparate
treatment of the Indian is justified because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering
the congressional policy of Indian self-government.”); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (holding
that statutes providing for prosecution of Indians under federal criminal law due to their enrollment in federally
recognized tribes do not violate due process or equal protection).
311
See, e.g., Puerto Rico’s complex debt, discussed in Part II.B.1 supra.
312
See, e.g., 10 States With Enormous Debt Problems: Report, HUFFPOST (Oct. 28, 2012), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/28/state-debt-report_n_1836603.html (noting that collectively, America’s state
governments owe $4.19 trillion); see also Gulati & Rasmussen, supra note 165, at 136 (discussing state debt
restructuring and “argu[ing] that while Congress can adjust [the power of states to restructure their debt] by
replacing a state’s scheme with one of its own, it cannot, consistent with federalism, prohibit state action while
putting nothing in its place.”).
313
For example, Mt. Gox, a bitcoin exchange, filed for bankruptcy in Japan in 2014. Patrick Riesterer &
Waleed Malik, Recognizing Foreign Proceedings Under the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act: Re
MtGox Co, WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Nov. 24, 2014), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/
international/recognizing-foreign-proceedings-under-the-canadian-bankruptcy-and-insolvency-act-re-mtgoxco/. For other examples of new debtor types, including high-technology companies and organizations that exist
entirely online, as well as a discussion of the difficulty of the Code accommodating these entities, see Laura N.
Coordes, New Rules for a New World: How Technology and Globalization Shape Bankruptcy Venue Decisions,
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as cryptocurrencies, that simply did not exist when the Code was created.314 Seen
in this light, the Bankruptcy Code is not a static set of tools but rather a launching
pad for new ideas. If bankruptcy relief continues to be broadened beyond the
Bankruptcy Code itself, further research will be necessary to determine the role
of the Bankruptcy Code in the future, and in particular to examine the question
of when it is appropriate or necessary to create “personalized,” non-Code-based
structured debt relief. Although this Article does not seek to resolve these issues
in a conclusory fashion, it does shed some light on their answers. When an entity,
be it an Indian tribe, a bank, or a U.S. territory, exhibits distinct differences in
structure and function from other entities contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code
and experiences the need for bankruptcy-specific tools, special legislation may
be warranted. If there are ways to replicate the pattern of providing tailored
bankruptcy relief to nontraditional debtor entities, there are likely many
prospective debtors that would benefit.

17 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 85, 93–95 (2017).
314
See Coordes, New Rules, supra note 313, at 93.

